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THE PARADOX OF AUXILIARY RIGHTS: THE 
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF8 INCRIMINATION 
AND THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS 
MICHAEL STEVEN GREENt 
ABSTRACT 
According to Locke's theory of the social contract, which was 
widely accepted by the Founders, political authority is limited by 
those natural moral rights that individuals reserve against the gov-
ernment. In this Article, I argue that Locke's theory generates para-
doxical conclusions concerning the government's authority over civil 
disobedients, that is, people who resist the government because they 
believe it is violating reserved moral rights. If the government lacks 
the authority to compel the civil disobedient to abide by its laws, the 
result is anarchism: The limits on governmental authority are what-
ever each individual says they are. If the government has this author-
ity, the result is authoritarianism: The limits on governmental author-
ity are whatever the government says they are. Both conclusions are 
unacceptable. 
Because of the Lockean paradox, auxiliary constitutional rights, 
whose purpose is to protect civil disobedience, are likewise paradoxi-
cal. I argue that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination and the Second Amendment right to keep and bear 
arms are examples of auxiliary rights, and I use the Lockean paradox 
to explain the intractable nature of the debates over whether these two 
rights provide anything of moral value. To their critics, these rights 
are anarchistic. All they do is give individuals the power to frustrate 
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the government's legitimate attempts to protect citizens against mutu-
ally-imposed risks of violence. To their supporters, these rights are a 
bulwark against authoritarianism. To deny citizens the power to resist 
the government is to accept that the only views about the limits of po-
litical authority that matter are the government's. These disagreements 
cannot be resolved, because both sides are right. Supporters of these 
rights are anarchistic and their critics are authoritarian. As long as we 
continue to accept the Founders' Lockean view that governmental 
authority is limited by reserved moral rights, we will never be able to 
reject or accept these two constitutional rights. 
The Lockean paradox also explains the difficulties that courts and 
academics have experienced delineating the scope of these rights in a 
conceptually satisfying manner. Here too I argue that these problems 
cannot be overcome. The limits that are placed on these rights will al-
ways be arbitrary and ad hoc. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Bill of Rights is a legacy of John Locke's theory of the social 
contract. Like Locke, the Founders believed that governmental 
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authority depends upon the consent of the governed.1 For this reason, 
it cannot be unlimited. Individuals submitting to the authority of the 
state can, and sometimes must,2 retain certain natural moral rights. 
The Bill of Rights protects these reserved rights.3 
Social contract theory stands at the heart of judicial and aca-
demic interpretation of the Bill of Rights. For example, the Fourth 
Amendment's legal scope has generally been read in the light of the 
moral right of privacy,4 which, it is argued, has been reserved against 
the government even at the cost of reduced efficiency in the admini-
stration of the criminallaw.5 Other provisions in the Bill of Rights are 
also commonly interpreted in the light of reserved moral rights.6 
1. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION 139 
(1988) ("Over a period of a century and a half [before the adoption of the Constitution], Amer-
ica became accustomed to the idea that government existed by the consent of the governed."); 
Greg Sergienko, Social Con/rae/ Neulralily and I he Religion Clauses of !he Federal ConsliiUiion, 
57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1263, 1268-72 (1996) ("[T)he Framers and the public .. . conceived govern-
ments as resulting from an agreement among people to provide a means for enforcing existing 
rights."). See also BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 182-87 (1967) (discussing the Founders' belief that government should be 
founded on a permanent constitution approved by the people); GORDON S. WOOD, THE 
RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 164-66 (1992) (comparing the English "pater-
nalistic" form of government with the colonial contractual form of government). 
2. Rights must be reserved when they are inalienable. For Locke's surprisingly narrow 
view of inalienable rights, see generally A. John Simmons, Inalienable Righ1s and Locke's Trea-
lises, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 175 (1983). 
3. United Sta tes v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 287-88 (1990) (Brennan, J. , dissent-
ing) ("[T]he Framers of the Bill of Rights did not purport to 'create' rights. Rather, they de-
signed the Bill of Rights to prohibit our Government from· infringing rights and liberties pre-
sumed to be pre-existing."). Some Federalists used Lockean social contract theory to argue that 
a Bill of Rights is dangerous. Since these rights were retained by individuals, the government 
had no authority to take them away, and thus no authority to grant them to individuals by law. 
Thomas 8. McAffee, The Bill of Righls, Social ConlraCI Theory, and 1he Righls "Relained" by 
1he People, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 267,267-69 (1992). 
4. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967) (" [T)he principal object of the Fourth 
Amendment is the protection of privacy."); see also Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949) 
(stating that the Fourth Amendment protects " human rights"); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 
616, 630 (1886) (noting that the Fourth Amendment protects " indefeasible" rights) . 
5. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourlh Amendmenl Firs/ Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 785 
(1994) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment must be interpreted in light of "interests of per-
sonhood, property, and privacy"); Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. 
REV. 1335, 1357-74 (describing privacy-right interpreta tions of the Fourth Amendment) ; Wil-
liam J. Stuntz, The DislribUiion of Fourlh Amendmenl Privacy , 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1265, 
1265 (1999) (describing "widespread agreement" in literature on the subject that the Fourth 
Amendment should protect the right of privacy). 
6. For a classic expression of the view that the Bill of Rights protects reserved moral 
rights, see RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 2 (1996) (advocating "moral reading" of the Constitution that interprets Consti-
tutional provisions as incarnations of abstract moral principles); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING 
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But for decades the privilege against self-incrimination has been 
at the center of academic controversy, because it appears incompati-
ble with this theory.7 The scope of the privilege, critics argue, fails to 
correspond to the scope of any reserved moral right. More recently, a 
similar academic controversy has developed concerning the moral 
purpose of the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms.~ 
Some defenders of these two rights have developed an alterna-
tive account of their moral purpose that appears in keeping with so-
cial contract theory.9 The privilege and the Second Amendment are 
auxiliary: they give individuals the power to defend their reserved 
rights when other forms of legal protection fail. 111 
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 190-91 (1977) (hereinafter DWORKIN, RIGHTS] (" If citizens have a moral 
right of free speech, then governments would do wrong to repeal the First Ame ndme nt that 
guarantees it, even if they were persuaded that the majority would be better off if speech were 
curtailed."). Rese rved moral rights are not used to justify every constitutional right. For exam-
ple, such an approach is not appropriate for rights that ensure the separation of powers or the 
preservation of the federal structure. !d. at 191; R. Kent Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and 
Constitutional Right, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 15, 52-53 (1981). For examples of interpretations 
of specific provisions in the Bill of Rights in the light of reserved moral rights, see Abe Fortas, 
The Fifth Amendment: Nemo Tenetur Prodere Seipsum, 25 CLEV. B. ASS'N J. 91 , 97- 98 (1954) 
(reading the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in the light of reserved natu-
ral rights) ; Sergienko, supra note 1, at 1268-72 (reading the Establishment and Free Exercise 
Clauses of the First Amendment in light of social contract theory and reserved natural rights) ; 
Suzanna Sherry, The Founders ' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U . CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1161-67 (1987) 
(reading the Ninth Amendment in light of reserved natura l rights) . 
7. See Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: Th e Self-
Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 889-98 (1995) (rejecting rights-based accounts of 
the privilege as unable to explain its scope) ; David Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the Privi-
lege Against Self-Incrimination?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1063, 1090-1147 (1986) (same); cf Daniel J . 
Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A Game- Theoretic Analysis of 
the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114 HARV. L. REV. 430, 435-37 (2000) (rejecting the view that 
the privilege protects only the rights of the guilty) . 
8. See, e.g. , Michael A. Bellesiles, Suicide Pact: New Readings of the Second Amendmem , 
16 CONST. COMMENT. 247, 256 (1999) (rejecting individual-rights justifications of the Second 
Amendment); William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Bear 
Arms, 43 DUKE L.J . 1236, 1239-41 (1994) (showing sympathy for the National Rifle Associa-
tion 's individual-rights stance on the Second Amendment) ; David C. Williams, Civic Republi-
canism and the Citizen Militia: The Terrifying Second Amendment, 101 YALE L.J . 551, 586-94 
(1991) (hereinafter Williams, Civic Republicanism] (rejecting views that the Second Amend-
ment protects personal rights); David C. Williams, The Militia Movement and Second Amend-
ment Revolution: Conjuring with the People , 81 CORNELL L. REV. 879,911-15 (1996) [hereinaf-
ter Williams, Militia Movement] (same); David Yassky, The Second Amendment: Structure, 
History, and ConstitLIIiona/ Change, 99 MICH. L. REV. 588, 615-21 (2000) (rejecting individual-
rights justifications of the Second Amendment). 
9. See infra note 35. 
10. That these two rights have their source in the Lockean social contract theory helps ex-
plain why they are taken more seriously in American legal and political traditions than they are 
on the European continent. See MIRJAN R . DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE 
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This Article is an exploration of auxiliary rights. My conclusion is 
surprising. I argue that auxiliary rights are paradoxical. By this I do 
not mean that they are contradictory and should be rejected. Instead, 
I mean that they can never be consistently accepted or rejected-so 
long as one adheres to the Founders' Lockean ideal of governmental 
authority limited by natural rights. As a result, courts will never be 
able to determine their scope in a coherent fashion. The limits courts 
place on these rights will always appear arbitrary and conceptually 
unmotivated. 
The paradox of auxiliary rights is tied to a more fundamental 
paradox concerning the government's authority to forbid civil disobe-
dience, that is, its authority to prohibit citizens' resistance to the state 
when they believe that its laws violate their reserved rights. On the 
one hand, if the government lacks this authority, its authority as a 
whole seems to evaporate. For individuals have the power to escape 
its authority, even when their reserved rights have not been violated, 
simply by believing that these rights have been violated. Lockeanism 
lapses into anarchism: the limits on the government's authority over 
an individual are simply whatever the individual says they are. 11 
On the other hand, if the government has the authority to forbid 
civil disobedience, then all limits on its authority seem to evaporate. 
For the government may do whatever it pleases to individuals, even 
when its actions violate their reserved rights, as long as it believes that 
AUTHORITY 8-15, 71-180 (1986) (discussing the differences between the American and Euro-
pean legal traditions in relation to the privilege and the adversarial system); B. Bruce-Briggs, 
The Great American Gun War, 45 PUB. INT. 37, 61 (1976) (discussing the differences between 
American and European legal traditions in relation to the right to bear arms). American tradi-
tions are more strongly influenced by consent theories of the state than their continental coun-
terparts, which tend to view citizens as having natural duties to join civil society. See DAMAsKA, 
supra, passim (describing the differences between the Anglo-American and continental political 
traditions). 
11. It is because of the threat of anarchism that those who engage in civil disobedience are 
generally considered legally obligated to accept punishment for their actions. Steven M. Bauer 
& Peter J. Eckerstrom, Note, The State Made Me Do It: The Applicability of the Necessity De-
fense to Civil Disobedience, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1173, 1190 (1987); see also CARL COHEN, CIVIL 
DISOBEDIENCE: CONSCIENCE, TACTICS, AND THE LAW 76-91 (1971) (discussing the objectives 
met by punishing civil disobedience); Sidney Hook, Social Protest and Civil Disobedience, in 
CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND VIOLENCE 59 (Jeffrie J. Murphy ed., 1971) (arguing that those who 
resort to civil disobedience are obligated to accept punishments and legal sanctions because at-
tempts to evade those punishments "erode the moral foundation of civil disobedience"). Even 
those who argue that some forms of civil disobedience should be legally protected do not claim 
that the civil disc':Jedient always has a right to this form of protection. See, e.g., Hugo Bedau, On 
Civil Disobedience, 58 J. PHIL. 653,663 (1961) (acknowledging that under certain circumstances, 
a government justifiably may force someone to act against his conscience). 
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these rights have not been violated. Lockeanism lapses into authori-
tarianism: the limits on governmental authority are simply whatever 
the government says they are. 
Just as civil disobedience is paradoxical within a Lockean frame-
work, so are auxiliary rights, which legally protect civil disobedience. 
The debate concerning these rights cannot be resolved within the 
Lockean framework, because each side can justifiably accuse the 
other of violating a core Lockean principle. Because these rights give 
individuals the means to resist the state whenever they feel it is ap-
propriate, even when their resistance violates the state's legitimate 
authority, critics of auxiliary rights can argue that they are "anarchis-
tic"12 and contrary to the "duty of citizenship."13 Auxiliary rights inco-
herently reintroduce the state of nature into civil society. However, if 
the state may refuse to provide citizens with auxiliary rights, it must 
have the authority to forbid legitimate defense of reserved rights. For 
this reason, supporters of auxiliary rights can argue that their critics 
are "totalitarian."14 Reserved moral rights mean nothing if the state 
may legitimately prohibit citizens from protecting these rights. With-
out auxiliary rights, the state's authority is unlimited. 
This debate is at an impasse because both sides are right. The 
supporters of auxiliary rights are anarchists, and their critics are to-
talitarians. The paradox ensures that no coherent middle ground be-
tween anarchism and totalitarianism can be staked out. The intracta-
ble nature of the debate over auxiliary rights is the reflection of an 
irresolvable conflict within Lockean political theory itself, and is a 
testimony to this theory's importance within the American political 
and legal tradition. 
This Article is divided into three parts. In Part I, I discuss in 
greater detail the Lockean paradox of civil disobedience and its abil-
ity to generate persuasive arguments both for and against auxiliary 
rights. In Part II, I outline how the paradox of auxiliary rights has 
generated irresolvable disagreement concerning the justifiability of 
12. Carl T. Bogus, The Hidden History of the Second Amendment, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
309, 320 (1998). 
13. Amar & Lettow, supra note 7, at 892; see also DOLINKO, supra note 7, at 1144 (con-
tending that autonomy-right justifications of the privilege are incompatible with "the whole in-
stitution of the criminal law," which is a testimony "to our reluctance to give free play to each 
individual's notions of what is right and wrong"). 
14. David Harmer, Securing a Free State: Why the Second Amendment Matters, 1998 BYU 
L. REV. 55, 55-56; see also ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, THE FIFrH AMENDMENT TODAY 70 (1955) 
("The totalitarian mind accepts all the means which promise the achievement of its ends."). 
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the privilege against self-incrimination, and how it has frustrated all 
attempts to delineate the scope of the privilege in a coherent fashion. 
In Part III, I do the same concerning the right to bear arms. 
I. THE PARADOX OF AUXILIARY RIGHTS 
A paradox arises when a set of plausible premises collectively 
generates, through acceptable reasoning, implausible or absurd con-
clusions.15 Lockean social contract theory is paradoxical because, al-
though prima facie plausible, the theory generates implausible con-
clusions concerning the authority of the government when . the 
government disagrees with individuals about whether it has violated 
their reserved rights. 
I begin this Part by describing the Lockean paradox of civil dis-
obedience in greater detail. I then identify four types of constitutional 
right (political, standard, instrumental, and auxiliary) on the basis of 
the moral role that each plays within a Lockean theory of the state, 
and argue that, because of the Lockean paradox, there are compelling 
arguments both for and against auxiliary rights. I end Part I with a 
discussion of how William Blackstone's theory of auxiliary rights, 
which Second Amendment advocates often cite, is a response to the 
Lockean paradox. 
A. The Lockean Paradox 
The heart of Locke's theory of the social contract is that citizens 
have contracted with one another to give up to the political commu-
nity certain rights that they had in the state of nature, most impor-
tantly their rights to adjudicate and punish violations of naturallaw.16 
Because people tend to interpret their own rights and the rights of 
their kin too broadly,17 private enforcement of natural law leads to 
feuding, which puts everyone in a worse position than they would be 
if they were subject to a single adjudicator. After entering into the so-
cial contract, rather than being permitted to act on one's own judg-
15. R.M. SAINSBURY, PARADOXES 1 (1988). 
16. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, in POLITICAL WRITINGS OF 
JOHN LOCKE§§ 94-99 (David Wooton ed., 1993) (1681). 
17. /d.§§ 13, 125. 
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ment about whether natural rights have been violated, one is bound 
by the decisions of the majority of the political community.18 
But it is also essential to Locke's theory that citizens retain cer-
tain natural rights against the community. 19 If these rights are vio-
lated, individuals return to the state of nature and may exercise their 
natural entitlement to protect themselves.20 The Lockean paradox of 
civil disobedience arises when one considers disagreements between 
individuals and their political community about whether a reserved 
right has been violated. Only two conclusions appear possible: either 
the community has the authority to determine whether these reserved 
rights have been violated (and so the authority to forbid citizens' at-
tempts to defend their rights), or it does not. 
If it does not have this authority, then political authority as a 
whole is undermined. To escape one's obligations to the community, 
all a citizen has to do is believe that the community has violated one 
of her reserved rights. For example, if the political community taxes 
individuals progressively, the wealthy may escape the obligation to 
pay most of their taxes if they believe that they reserved the right to 
pay only a poll tax-even if, in fact, they reserved no such right. Po-
litical authority would exist only if the individual believes that it does. 
But political authority was supposed to obligate individuals to abide 
by the decisions of the political community whether or not they be-
lieve its decisions are correct. 
One might argue that the community may still forbid resistance 
to its laws despite its lack of authority over the civil disobedient, be-
cause, like any other player within the state of nature, it is free to act 
on the basis of its views about natural law. Since it believes that it has 
not violated reserved rights, it may act on this perception. But such an 
argument conflicts with a core Lockean principle. For Locke, the 
community can exercise a monopoly on coercive power only if it has 
authority, not simply because it thinks its views are right and happens 
to have the power to enforce its wil1.21 If the ability to coerce dissent-
ers to abide by its moral judgment were enough to justify the political 
18. /d. §§ 95, 99; A. JOHN SIMMONS, ON THE EDGE OF ANARCHY: LOCKE, CONSENT, AND 
THE LIMITS OF SOCIETY 69-71 (1993); D.A. LLOYD THOMAS, LOCKE ON GOVERNMENT 27 
(1995). 
19. LOCKE, supra note 16, §§ 131,135, 149,168, 172. 
20. /d. §§ 168,208. 
21. See THOMAS, supra note 18, at 49 (" [Locke] wants to show that a government which 
has been instituted in the appropriate way, and which honestly tries to enforce the law of nature 
has awhority over its citizens."). 
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community's monopoly on force, there would be no need for the so-
cial contract in the first place.22 Accordingly, if the political commu-
nity lacks authority over the civil disobedient, it has no right to coerce 
compliance with its laws. 
On the other hand, if the community does have the authority to 
determine whether reserved rights are violated, then all limits on its 
authority evaporate. Forthe community may violate reserved rights 
whenever the majority within it believes that they have not been vio-
lated. It does not matter that citizens entering civil society in fact re-
served a right against discrimination according to religion. The politi-
cal community may nevertheless prohibit Catholicism and justifiably 
punish Catholics for resisting, provided that the majority comes to the 
conclusion that no right against religious discrimination was reserved 
or that the prohibition of Catholicism does not violate this right. Po-
litical authority exists whenever the community believes it does. But 
reserved rights, if violated, were supposed to free individuals from 
any duty to the community-no matter how the community viewed 
the matter. 
The conclusion one wants to reach is that political authority ends 
not when the individual thinks it does and not when the community 
thinks it does, but precisely when reserved moral rights have been vio-
lated. As a moral principle, this is unobjectionable. But since there 
can be disagreements about its application, consent theories of the 
state must answer the question whether the political community has 
the authority to decide these disagreements. The paradox of civil dis-
obedience is that whatever position one takes on this matter, some 
element of Lockean political theory is violated. 
The paradox helps explain Locke's muddled approach to civil 
disobedience. On the one hand, he sometimes insists that those who 
consent to join the political community are bound to accept its deci-
sions, no matter what.23 To give the individual the right to "plead ex-
ception" to the social contract would render it voidable at will.24 As a 
22. /d. I came to a different conclusion in Michael S. Green, The Privilege's Last Stand: The 
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and the Right to Rebel Against the State, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 
627,698-99 (I999). There I argued that social contract theory has the obligation to explain only 
the moral possibility of governmental authority, not answer the question of who has the author-
ity to decide if authority exists. In cases of disagreement about political authority, the govern-
ment may simply act on the basis of its perception that it has authority, without claiming 
authority to decide this disagreement. 
23. LOCKE, supra note 16, §§ 87, 88. 
24. /d. §§ 94, 243. 
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result, he argues that the political community alone has the right to 
resist tyranny.25 Locke's considered view, however, appears to be that 
an individual does have the right to defend herself against the com-
munity if it violates her reserved rights: "And where the body of the 
people, or any single man, is deprived of their right, or is under the 
exercise of a power without right, and have no appeal on earth, there 
they have a liberty to appeal to heaven, whenever they judge the 
cause of sufficient moment."26 But if the individual may plead excep-
tion to the social contract, has it not been rendered voidable at will, 
just as Locke himself feared? Locke provides no answer. 
B. A Taxonomy of Constitutional Rights 
So far I have described the paradox of civil disobedience as aris-
ing when an individual and the political community disagree about 
whether reserved rights are violated.27 In fact, their disagreement 
would not be direct, because the political community does not exer-
cise its authority over individuals through concrete political decisions, 
but only by entrusting its powers to a government.28 If the political 
community has entrusted its powers to a government and this gov-
ernment does not violate reserved rights, its decisions are binding 
upon citizens. The real paradox of civil disobedience arises, therefore, 
when an individual and a government that maintains the political 
community's trust disagree about whether the government has vio-
lated the individual's reserved rights. 
Because the government has only that authority delegated to it 
by the political community, the community may demand as a condi-
25. /d. §§ 149, 240, 243; see also SIMMONS, supra note 18, at 172-74 ("The standard read-
ing ... seems to be that Locke's right of resistance can be held only by the body of the people, 
its proper exercise to be determined only by the majority of the body politic."); THOMAS, supra 
note 18, at 70 ("Apparently Locke's meaning is that the deprivation of the rights of a particular 
person may be a sufficient occasion for the majority to withdraw its consent, but no one has a 
right to resist unless this single instance has persuaded the majority to withdraw its consent."). 
26. LOCKE, supra note 16, § 168 (emphasis added).1ndeed he is concerned to show that the 
general recognition of this right will not create serious disorder, since aggrieved individuals can-
not overcome the coercive power of the political community as a whole. /d. §§ 208, 230. There 
would be no need to respond to this worry if individuals did not have the right of resistance to 
begin with. See SIMMONS, supra note 18, at 174-77 (arguing that Locke's writings support an 
individual right of resistance). Locke's appeal to the political community's power to compel 
compliance is, however, odd. Presumably he does not mean that it has the right to compel com-
pliance, for this would be in violation of the Lockean principle that a monopoly on force is justi-
fied only given authority. 
27. See supra Part I.A. 
28. LOCKE, supra note 16, §§ 136, 149, 211-12,221-22,240. 
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tion for this delegation a constitutional restriction on the govern-
ment's freedom of action. If the community accepts Lockean political 
theory, this restriction is likely to be informed by Lockean principles, 
outlined above, concerning the source and limits of the government's 
and the community's authority. In this section I discuss four types of 
constitutional right that might be demanded by the community: po-
litical, standard, instrumental, and auxiliary. I argue that a Lockean 
political community would demand an auxiliary right in order to pro-
tect those forms of civil disobedience that are morally permissible ac-
cording to Lockean political theory. But because civil disobedience 
has a paradoxical place within this theory, the auxiliary right will also 
be paradoxical. 
I begin, however, with political rights, which exist to ensure that 
the delegation of authority from the political community to the gov-
ernment has in fact occurred. Although the act of trust that legiti-
mates a government is majoritarian in nature, the government re-
ceiving this trust need not be democratic.29 The only moral right that 
an individual has to influence the decisions of the government is her 
right to participate in the creation of the trust that the political com-
munity as a whole gives to the government.30 Nevertheless, the ma-
joritarian nature of this trust makes it appropriate for the political 
community to entrust its authority only to a government with a 
democratic political structure, because that can ensure that the com-
munity's trust is maintained. Furthermore, the community might give 
its trust only to a government that provides individuals with constitu-
tional rights, such as the right to vote, that protect democratic partici-
pation in governmental decisions. These individual constitutional 
rights whose purpose it is to ensure that the government retains the 
political community's trust are political rights. 
But it is also natural for the political community to demand, as a 
condition for the delegation of its authority, constitutional provisions 
that protect what the community believes are individuals' reserved 
rights. Because these reserved moral rights trump even the majori-
tarian interests of the political community, they are likely to be pro-
29. /d. §§ 132-33; RUTH W. GRANT, JOHN LOCKE'S LIBERALISM 117-19 (1987); THOMAS, 
supra note 18, at 27-29. 
30. Since many of the legitimate governments that Locke describes are those in which the 
individual has no ability to influence the decisions of the government, he cannot believe that 
individuals have a right to such influence-except for the right to participate in the trust that the 
political community gives to a government and the right to withdraw that trust through a com-
munitarian revolution. 
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tected through countermajoritarian constitutional rights that have a 
scope similar to the scope of these reserved moral rights. I call these 
constitutional rights, which would include the Fourth Amendment 
and most other provisions in the Bill of Rights, standard rights. 
In addition to standard rights, the political community might de-
mand of the government certain countermajoritarian constitutional 
rights that protect reserved moral rights indirectly. These constitu-
tional rights would not have a scope that is similar to the scope of any 
reserved moral right. Rather than protecting reserved moral rights di-
rectly, they would protect something that tends to protect reserved 
moral rights. An example of such an instrumental right is the right to a 
trial by jury. If one has a reserved natural right in criminal procedure, 
it is not the right to a jury of one's peers, but the right to a reasonable 
and impartial factfinder, which receives standard-right protection in 
the Constitution through the Due Process Clause. But because the 
government is not always in a position to know whether this reserved 
right has been violated, an imperfect instrument, the jury, might also 
be protected, because there is reason to believe that protecting the 
jury will indirectly protect the reserved right.31 
The moral argument for instrumental rights is thoroughly em-
pirical. Because the only reason for the institutional right is its ten-
dency to protect reserved moral rights, there will be no reason for the 
institutional right if it fails to perform this function. If it turns out that 
juries are irredeemably irrational and biased, no moral argument for 
a right to a jury trial exists.32 Arguments for standard rights are not 
empirical in this sense. Because what they protect is the reserved 
moral right itself, they are justified by straightforward moral argu-
ments that the reserved right exists. 
Of course, there is a sense in which all constitutional rights are 
instrumental, for it will always be morally relevant whether a consti-
tutional right, as an empirical matter, actually protects what it sets out 
to protect. It would undoubtedly be morally relevant if the Fourth 
Amendment failed for some reason to protect privacy. But instru-
mental rights have an extra element of instrumentalism that makes 
31. See, e.g., Colleen P. Murphy, Integrating the Constitutional Authority of Civil and 
Criminal Juries , 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 723, 727-54 (1993) (interpreting the right to a jury trial 
as instrumental to the fundamental right to a rational and impartial factfinder). 
32. No reason, that is, given the instrumental-right rationale presented immediately above. 
Other rationales for the right to a jury trial could be constructed. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 271-73 (1998) (interpreting the right 
to a jury trial in light of a prospective juror's right to participate in government) . 
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them vulnerable to empirical arguments to which standard rights are 
immune. The right to a jury trial is vulnerable not merely to argu-
ments that it fails to provide citizens with jury trials, but also to argu-
ments that jury trials fail to provide citizens with anything morally 
worthwhile. 
In contrast, the argument for auxiliary rights rests upon the un-
deniable possibility that even a government with a constitution that 
contains standard and instrumental rights might nevertheless violate 
reserved moral rights. All standard and instrumental rights do is give 
legal force to the political community's views about the limits of gov-
ernmental authority. Their existence is neither a necessary nor a suf-
ficient condition for a government respecting reserved moral rights. A 
direct democracy with no standard or instrumental rights in its consti-
tution can respect reserved rights, and a government with such consti-
tutional restrictions can violate reserved rights, either because the re-
strictions are ignored or because they fail to track the moral rights 
that were actually reserved by individuals. In the end, all standard 
and instrumental rights, no matter how countermajoritarian they are 
legally, are the expression of the view of the majority of the political 
community. And there is no assurance that these views will be cor-
rect. For this reason, civil disobedience even against a government re-
stricted by standard and instrumental rights can be morally legitimate. 
Auxiliary rights are intended to address situations where stan-
dard and instrumental rights fail to protect reserved moral rights, and 
civil disobedience is morally permissible. But any attempt to identify 
and constitutionally protect only those particular citizens entitled to 
civil disobedience would simply create another communitarian vision 
of the extent of reserved rights-against which individuals might still 
justifiably engage in civil disobedience. Comprehensive protection of 
legitimate civil disobedience is possible only by giving individuals the 
power to resist according to their views about governmental authority. 
This is what an auxiliary right does. It gives to individuals those pow-
ers to resist the government to which they would be entitled if the 
government were violating their reserved rights. 
But auxiliary rights are just as paradoxical as the civil disobedi-
ence they protect. On the one hand, they are necessary to avoid 
authoritarianism. Assume that the government argues that auxiliary 
rights are unnecessary because it is satisfied that its standard and in-
strumental rights are sufficient to protect reserved rights. By giving 
this argument, the government must be claiming the authority to de-
cide disagreements concerning reserved rights. It is not enough that it 
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is simply satisfied that reserved rights are protected and has the 
power to coerce individuals who disagree. It must have authority over 
these individuals. But if it has the authority to decide disagreements 
concerning reserved rights, its authority is unconstrained by these 
rights. The only constraints on its authority are its beliefs about re-
served rights. And this is contrary to Lockean principles concerning 
the extent of political authority. 
On the other hand, to give individuals auxiliary rights is to give 
them the power to frustrate the state's actions simply because they 
believe that their reserved rights are violated. Auxiliary rights allow 
citizens to frustrate the state even when it asserts legitimate authority. 
They are anarchistic. And this is also contrary to Lockean principles 
concerning the extent of political authority. 
Indeed, because they allow each individual to act on the basis of 
her perceptions of natural rights, auxiliary rights reintroduce the state 
of nature into civil society. As a result, they can recreate the very 
problem that motivated the social contract in the first place. Permit-
ting individuals to act on the basis of their perceptions of natural 
rights can, in the long run, make everyone's natural rights less secure. 
Although auxiliary rights exist to protect natural rights against viola-
tion by the government, their long-term effect can be an increase in 
the violation of natural rights. 
Auxiliary rights are easily confused with both instrumental and 
standard rights. Consider the subtle but crucial differences between 
the following standard-, instrumental-, and auxiliary-right interpreta-
tions of the right to bear arms.33 
Assume that in the state of nature individuals have a natural 
right to use arms to protect themselves against violations of their 
other rights. If bearing arms is a natural right, then it has moral value 
even if the aggregate effects of everyone exercising this right are 
negative. That there is a natural right to privacy means that privacy 
has value even if constant surveillance by the police would make indi-
viduals more secure in their persons and property. By the same token, 
if there is a natural right to use arms in self-defense, then this use of 
arms has value even if universal disarmament would reduce the 
chances that other rights would be violated.34 
33. I discuss these arguments more fully in Part III, infra. 
34. See infra Part III.B (arguing that a natural right to bear arms in self-defense follows 
from Lockean principles). 
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If there is such a natural right to bear arms, and individuals re-
served it upon entering civil society, then a government would have to 
respect this right if it is to retain political authority over individuals. A 
standard right to bear arms would help ensure that the government 
stayed within these bounds by establishing a constitutional entitle-
ment with a scope comparable to the scope of this reserved right. 
On the other hand, assume that this natural right to bear arms 
does not exist or would not be reserved upon entering civil society. 
Nevertheless, if the widespread use of arms for self-defense as an em-
pirical matter made it more likely that people's other reserved rights 
would be respected by the government or third parties, this would be 
an argument for an instrumental right to bear arms. The right to bear 
arms would be justified, not because bearing arms has moral value in 
itself, but because the aggregate effect of allowing individuals to bear 
arms is the protection of reserved rights. Understood as instrumental, 
however, the right is vulnerable to empirical counterarguments. If it is 
discovered that widespread gun ownership makes reserved rights less 
secure, then the right to bear arms can be abolished without any 
moral loss. Since a foundational principle of Lockean political theory 
is that individuals' self-interest tends to distort their perceptions of 
their natural rights, an instrumental-right interpretation of the right to 
bear arms is in tension with Lockeanism. For an instrumental-right 
interpretation assumes, contrary to Locke's own views, that allowing 
individuals to enforce their perceptions concerning natural rights in-
creases the likelihood that natural rights will be respected. 
Finally, if the right to bear arms is auxiliary, it would exist to al-
low individuals to exercise their natural right to use arms to defend 
their other rights, not because they reserved this right upon entering 
civil society, but only because they will be freed from the restraints of 
civil society if the government violates their reserved rights. Unlike 
an instrumental right to bear arms, the fact that the aggregate effect 
of this use of arms for self-defense is an increase in the level of viola-
tions of natural rights is not a reason to reject this auxiliary right. 
Freed of any duty to the government, individuals return to the state 
of nature, and may once again do what they need to do to protect 
their rights, without concern for whether the aggregate effect of eve-
ryone exercising the same rights of self-defense is positive or nega-
tive. Therefore, like a standard right to bear arms, it would not be an 
argument against this auxiliary right that bearing arms, in the aggre-
gate, does nothing to make us more secure in our persons and prop-
erty. 
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But there is a critical difference between an auxiliary and a stan-
dard right to bear arms. If the right to bear arms is standard, then 
every person bearing arms in self -defense is properly exercising his re-
served right, just as every person asserting Fourth Amendment pro-
tections is properly exercising his right to privacy. But if the right to 
bear arms is auxiliary, only those engaging in legitimate civil disobe-
dience, that is, those whose other reserved rights are being violated 
by the government, are legitimately exercising their natural right to 
bear arms. Those whose reserved rights are being respected by the 
government could have their arms taken away in the interest of mu-
tual security. An auxiliary right to bear arms nevertheless applies to 
everyone because the government would be claiming absolute politi-
cal authority if it attempted to discriminate between legitimate and 
illegitimate civil disobedience. 
C. Blackstone on Auxiliary Rights 
I have adopted the term "auxiliary right" because it is often used 
by Second Amendment advocates to describe the legal protection of 
the natural right to defend oneself against governmental violations of 
reserved rights.35 They in turn borrowed the term from William 
Blackstone, whose Commentaries on the Laws of England was influ-
enced by Lockean social contract theory,36 and who was himself an 
important influence on the Founders and on the early development of 
American law.37 In his Commentaries, Blackstone described the right 
to bear arms as an auxiliary right, that is, a "barrier[] to protect and 
maintain inviolate ... primary rights."38 
35. JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-
AMERICAN RIGHT 130 (1994); Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second 
Amendment: Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309, 322-23 (1991); 
Don B. Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment and the Ideology of Self-Protection , 9 CONST. 
COMMENT. 87, 93 (1992); cf Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Political Liberty, and the 
Right to Self Preservation , 39 ALA. L. REV. 103, 120 n.41 (1987) (citing Blackstone as being in 
favor of the view that the right to bear arms is an absolute right). 
36. See e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *120-23 ("So that laws, when pru-
dently framed, are by no means subversive but rather introductive of liberty; for (as Mr. Locke 
has well observed) where there is no law, there is no freedom."). 
37. See DONALD S. LUTZ, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 142-44 
(1988) (demonstrating that Blackstone was the second most cited author during the Founders' 
time); Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5-19 (1996) (dis-
cussing Thomas Jefferson's reliance on Blackstone's Commentaries). 
38. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at *136; see also id. at *139-41 (describing the auxiliary 
right to bear arms) . 
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But, contrary to prevailing interpretations of Blackstone among 
Second Amendment advocates, he did not think that the right to bear 
arms exists to allow individuals to resist a majoritarian government. 
The reason is that, unlike Locke, Blackstone did not believe that in-
dividuals have any reserved moral rights that could justify such resis-
tance.39 Indeed, because Blackstone thought that the only moral right 
that members of civil society have is the right to participate in the 
collective trust that gives governments legitimacy, he concluded that 
no countermajoritarian legal rights should exist either. In the end, 
Blackstone's "auxiliary" rights are actually political rights, that is, le-
gal rights whose function is to ensure that the trust that the political 
community gives to the government is maintained. The reason he 
comes to this surprising conclusion is the Lockean paradox. 
Like Locke, Blackstone accepts the idea of the social contract, 
that is, the view that everyone gives up the "natural liberty" or 
"power of acting as one thinks fit" that one possesses in the state of 
nature "in consideration of receiving the advantages of mutual com-
merce."40 Entering civil society, he argues, obliges one "to conform to 
those laws, which the community has thought proper to establish."41 
At first glance, it also appears that, like Locke, Blackstone believes 
that individuals have reserved rights against the political community. 
After all, he speaks of personal security, personal liberty and private 
property as "absolute" constitutional rights.42 But Blackstone rejects 
the idea that violations of an individual's life, liberty or property al-
low her to resist the political community. His reason is the Lockean 
paradox. 
Blackstone interprets these three absolute constitutional rights in 
the light of disagreements between the political community and indi-
viduals about whether these rights have been violated. If the political 
community lacks the authority to judge whether it has trespassed 
against these rights, then civil society is undermined. To return to the 
state of nature, a citizen merely would have to believe that the com-
munity has violated one of these rights. 
39. See infra notes 43-58 and accompanying text; see also Steven J. Heyman, Natural Rights 
and the Second Amendment, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 237, 252-60 (2000) (observing that Black-
stone believed that only the political community as a whole has the right to resist tyranny). 
40. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at *121; see also Heyman, supra note 39, at 255 (de-
scribing Blackstone's interpretation of the social contract). 
41. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at *121. 
42. /d. at *136. 
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It is for this reason that Blackstone denies that individuals may 
defend these absolute rights against the political community. Civil 
disobedience is justifiable only when "the public voice proclaims such 
resistance necessary."43 Only the political community as a whole has 
the right of resistance, by withdrawing its trust from a tyrannical gov-
ernment. Giving "every individual the right of ... employing private 
force to resist even private oppression," Blackstone argues, is "pro-
ductive of anarchy."44 
By giving the community the authority to determine whether re-
served rights are violated, Blackstone has nullified their role as a re-
striction on the community's political authority. The limits on its 
authority are simply whatever the community (and its legislature) 
says they are. To be sure, the community currently says that individu-
als have reserved rights to life, liberty and property. But individuals 
have these rights only because the community says so. 
In short, the Lockean paradox compels Blackstone to give up ei-
ther civil society or limited government. He chooses to give up limited 
government. He accepts that the political community, as expressed in 
the legislature, has an "absolute despotic power."45 The government 
has only those limits that it has imposed upon itself. It is the judge of 
its right to judge. 
lt is understandable, therefore, that Blackstone thinks of abso-
lute constitutional rights not as countermajoritarian legal restraints on 
the legislature, but as the expression of the legislative will. It is natu-
ral for Americans to assume that by saying that absolute rights are 
part of "the constitution,"46 Blackstone means that courts may strike 
down legislation that violates these rights. But he rejects judicial re-
view as "subversive of all government,"47 arguing that the legislature 
is "the sovereign power ... (which) acknowledges no superior upon 
earth."48 The political community must have entrusted its unlimited 
authority to some branch, and Blackstone argues that this branch was 
43. /d. at *244. 
44. /d. at *244; see also id.: 
For civil liberty, rightly understood, consists in protecting the rights of individuals by 
the united force of society: society cannot be maintained, and of course can exert no 
protection, without obedience to some sovereign power: and obedience is an empty 
name, if every individual has a right to decide how far he himself shall obey. 
45. !d. at *156. 
46. /d. 
47. /d. at *91. 
48. /d. at *90; see also id. at *157. 
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the legislature.49 Blackstone's absolute constitutional rights are there-
fore best thought of as the will of the legislature, rather than a legal 
• • 50 
restramt upon Its power. 
The same point applies to auxiliary rights. For Blackstone, aux-
iliary rights "serve principally as barriers to protect and maintain in-
violate the three great and primary rights"51 by providing means for 
their enforcement. But since these three absolute rights are only the 
expression of the legislative will, auxiliary rights protect these abso-
lute rights by sustaining and protecting legislative power. 
Blackstone offers five examples of auxiliary rights. They are: (1) 
"[t]he constitution, powers and privileges of parliament"; (2) "the 
limitation of the king's prerogative, by bounds so certain and notori-
ous, that it is impossible he should exceed them without the consent 
of the people"; (3) the right "of applying to the courts of justice for 
redress of injuries"; ( 4) "the right of petitioning the king, or either 
house of parliament, for the redress of grievances"; and (5) the right 
of the people "of having arms for their defense, suitable to their con-
dition and degree, and such as are allowed by law."52 This final right is 
"a public allowance, under due restrictions, of the natural right of re-
sistance and self-preservation, when the sanctions of society and laws 
are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression."53 
According to Blackstone, the first auxiliary right protects abso-
lute rights by encouraging a vigorous legislature, which makes it "im-
probable that laws should be enacted destructive of generalliberty."54 
Although this auxiliary right might give individual citizens a voice in 
the formation of the laws along majoritarian grounds, it does not give 
them the legal means to frustrate democratically enacted laws if these 
laws violate life, liberty or property. The second and the third auxil-
iary rights in turn merely ensure that parliamentary lawmaking power 
shall be enforced. The second right keeps the executive from "acting 
49. /d. at *156 ("[Parliament] hath sovereign and uncontrolable authority in making, con-
firming, enlarging, restraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving, and expounding [all] laws ... this 
being the place where that absolute despotic power, which must in all governments reside 
somewhere, is entrusted by the constitution of these kingdoms."). 
50. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 261 (1969) 
("For Blackstone ... every act of Parliament was in a sense a part of the Constitution, and all 
law, customary and statutory, was thus constitutional."). 
51. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at *136. 
52. /d. at *136-39. 
53. /d. at *139. 
54. Id. at *137. 
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either beyond or in contradiction to the laws, that are framed and es-
tablished by [Parliament],"55 and the third right to judicial redress is 
the right to the "protection and benefit of the laws."56 To the extent 
that these are individual legal rights, they are merely rights that the 
majoritarian decisions of the legislature be respected. Likewise, the 
fourth auxiliary right, although providing yet another avenue for ag-
grieved citizens to have a voice in the formation of the laws, once 
again does not give them an avenue to frustrate the law's enforce-
ment if life, liberty, or property are violated. 
It might appear that Blackstone's fifth auxiliary right, which gives 
to the people "arms for their defence, suitable to their condition and 
degree,"57 provides a legal avenue for individual resistance against the 
majority. But Blackstone insists that individuals have a right to bear 
arms "such as are allowed by law,"5H that is, only to the extent that the 
legislature allows it. The right to bear arms is the expression of the 
community's will, not a restriction upon this will. It is the commu-
nity's right to arm itself as a protection against a tyrannical minority, 
not an individual's right to arm herself as a protection against a ty-
rannical majority. To the extent that it puts arms in the hands of indi-
viduals, this entitlement is, like all of Blackstone's constitutional 
rights, a political right. 
Of course, there is no reason to accept Blackstone's dismissal of 
judicial review. The political community is not required to place its 
trust in majoritarian legal institutions. It may give the judicial branch 
some or all of its political authority if it wishes, thereby giving that 
branch, and not the legislature, the authority to determine the extent 
of political power. But even if it does, the judicial branch just as much 
as the legislative may fail to protect reserved rights. To claim that an 
individual nevertheless has a duty to abide by judicial decisions con-
cerning the extent of these rights is to give to the judiciary the very 
same absolute despotic power that Blackstone gives to the legislature. 
This is no closer to overcoming authoritarianism. The only means of 
ending authoritarianism is to empower citizens themselves to protect 
their rights as they see fit. This is the idea of auxiliary rights as I un-
derstand the term. The privilege against self-incrimination and the 
right to bear arms are examples of these rights. 
55. /d. 
56. !d. at *138. 
57. !d. at *139. 
58. /d. 
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II. THE PARADOX AND THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST 
SELF-INCRIMINATION 
133 
The privilege against self-incrimination is an enigma. The law on 
its scope is universally recognized to be a hopeless muddle-"an in-
consistent combination of difficult-to-justify broad rules and a hodge-
podge of miscellaneous exceptions."59 Even the question of whether it 
serves any moral purpose has yet to be resolved. On the one hand, 
there is an enormous literature, going back at least to Jeremy Ben-
tham, arguing that the privilege has no moral justification60-that it is 
a "constitutional mistake"61 that "cannot be justified either function-
ally or conceptually."62 According to the critics, the privilege simply 
frustrates, for no good reason, the state's legitimate attempts to en-
force criminal law. 
And yet support for the privilege remains widespread and tena-
cious. Many take the privilege to be a moral axiom that reflects some 
59. John Fabian Witt, Making the Fifth: The Constitutionalization of American Self-
Incrimination Doctrine, 1791-1903, 77 TEX. L REV. 825, 908 (1999); see also SUSAN EASTON, 
THE CASE FOR THE RIGHT TO SILENCE 207-35 (2d ed. 1998) (examining the tension between 
the privilege and the use of bodily samples in evidence); Amar & Lettow, supra note 7, at 858 
(criticizing case law on the privilege as incoherent); Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Required Rec-
ords Doctrine: Its Lessons for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 7 
(1986) ("The limitations [courts] invoke, although defensible, do not flow ineluctably from the 
history or language of the fifth amendment."). 
60. 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 207-83 (Garland Publish-
ing 1978) (1827); SIDNEY HOOK, COMMON SENSE AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 66-101 (1957); 
WALTER V. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY 59-76 (1967); Amar & Lettow, supra note 
7, at 889-98; Ian Dennis, instrumental Protection, Human Right or Functional Necessity? Reas-
sessing the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 54 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 342, 348-59 (1995); 
Dolinko, supra note 7, passim; Donald A. Dripps, Foreword: Against Police Interrogation-And 
the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699, 711-18 (1988); 
Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constiflltional Change, 37 U. 
CIN. L REV. 671, 679-95 (1968); Green, supra note 22, at 656-68; Charles T. McCormick, Law 
and the Future: Evidence, 51 Nw. U. L. REV. 218, 222 (1956); John McNaughton, The Privilege 
Against Self-Incrimination: Its Constitutional Affectation, Raison d'Etre and Miscellaneous Im-
plications, 51 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 138, 142-51 (1960); Henry T. Terry, 
Constitutional Provisions Against Forcing Self-Incrimination, 15 YALE L.J. 127, 127-30 (1906); 
John H. Wigmore, Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Prodere, 5 HARV. L. REV. 71, 87 (1891); C. Dicker-
man Williams, Problems of the Fifth Amendment, 24 FORDHAM L. REV. 19, 22-23 (1955); see 
also Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937) (Cardozo, J.) ("Justice ... would not perish 
if the accused were subject to a duty to respond to orderly inquiry."). 
61. Dripps, supra note 60, at 718. 
62. Dolinko, supra note 7, at 1147. Such criticisms generally do not extend to all protec-
tions that have been found to have their source in the privilege. A right of silence during custo-
dial detention by the police (and right to be informed of this right) might be justified, even if the 
core protection of the privilege-the right of the criminal defendant to refuse to take the stand 
during trial--<:annot be successfully defended. 
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"of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations."63 The privi-
lege, supporters argue, is tied "to the nature of a free man and to his 
relationship to the state. "64 
The irresolvable character of the debate over the privilege and 
the muddled case law on its scope are the result of the paradox of 
auxiliary rights. My goal is not to canvass all possible justifications of 
the privilege and show, on the basis of the historical evidence,65 that 
an auxiliary justification is the only viable one. The best I can do here 
is outline standard, instrumental, and auxiliary justifications and show 
how the latter best captures core intuitions that many people have in 
favor of the privilege. I then argue that, because of the paradox, the 
debate over the justifiability of an auxiliary privilege cannot be suc-
cessfully resolved, and judicial attempts to determine its scope in a 
principled fashion cannot succeed. 
A. Standard-Right Justifications 
Like other provisions in the Bill of Rights, the privilege against 
self-incrimination creates a sphere of legal protection against certain 
actions by the government. Whereas the Fourth Amendment protects 
a citizen against being subjected to unreasonable searches and sei-
zures,66 the privilege protects him against being "compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself."67 Because most provi-
sions in the Bill of Rights are standard rights, it is common for de-
fenders of the privilege to argue that the sphere of legal protection 
63. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964); see also GRISWOLD, supra note 
14, at 73 (stating that the privilege is "an expression of the moral striving of the community"); 
Fortas, supra note 6, at 98-100 (proposing that the privilege reflects the view that the individual 
and the state are equals). 
64. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,261 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). 
65. In fact, the legislative history on the privilege against self-incrimination is so sketchy 
that it is virtually useless in interpreting this right. See United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 674 
(1998) ("[T]here is no helpful legislative history." ); LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH 
AMENDMENT 430 (2d ed. 1986) (stating that from 1776 to 1791, legislative proceedings and 
other literature provide insufficient evidence of the rationale behind the privilege); Eben Mo-
glen, The Privilege in British North America: The Colonial Period to the Fifth Amendment, in 
R.H. HELMHOLZ ET AL., THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 109, 136-38 (1997) 
("[T]he legislative history of the Fifth Amendment adds little to our understanding of the his-
tory of the privilege."). 
66. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
67. U.S. CONST. amend. Y. 
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created by the privilege has a scope equivalent to a reserved moral 
right.68 
But standard-right justifications of the privilege have trouble 
making sense of the following simple fact: the privilege applies only 
when its protections are to one's advantage in connection with a 
criminal case.69 If there is no possibility of criminal punishment, one 
may be compelled to speak. The problem is how a reserved moral 
right could exist only when it frustrated criminal punishment. 
For example, although the Fourth Amendment can be used by a 
criminal defendant to frustrate the case against him, it does so as a 
side effect of protecting something that exists whether or not it has 
this effect-privacy. The Fourth Amendment is violated even by un-
reasonable searches or seizures that fail to uncover anything incrimi-
nating.70 That the Fourth Amendment frustrates criminal punishment 
is not a necessary condition for its application. 
It is for this reason that the privilege cannot be understood as 
protecting privacy. The privilege can do nothing to prevent the com-
pelled revelation of even very private facts, provided that their reve-
lation is not self-incriminating.71 If protecting privacy were truly the 
68. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 194-97 (1988) (sug-
gesting that the privilege protects the accused's rights to dignity and integrity); Robert Heidt, 
The Fifth Amendment Privilege and Documents-Cutting Fisher 's Tangled Line, 49 Mo. L. REV. 
439,468 (1984) (proposing that the privilege rests upon Lockean individualism). 
69. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U .S. 454, 462 (1981) (stating that use of the privilege depends 
on the nature of the defendant's statement and " the exposure which it invites"); Marchetti v. 
United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968) (basing application of the privilege on whether there are 
real "hazards of incrimination"); Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) (noting 
that the privilege extends both to statements that would in themselves support a conviction and 
to statements that would furnish "a link in the chain of evidence" needed to convict). 
70. See, e.g. , Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954) (stating that excluding incrimi-
nating evidence because of a Fourth Amendment violation "does nothing to protect innocent 
persons who are the victims of illegal but fruitless searches"); Akhil Reed Amar, Against Exclu-
sion (Exceptio Protect Tr!!lh or Prevent Privacy Violations), 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 457, 
463-64 (1997) (remarking that the benefits of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule are 
"upside down," because it helps the guilty, not the innocent); Christopher Slobogin, Why Liber-
als Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 401 (arguing for the effective 
damages remedy because the exclusionary rule does not compensate innocent people whose 
Fourth Amendment rights are violated). 
71. Despite the difficulties with privacy justifications of the privilege, the Supreme Court 
has occasionally suggested that the privilege protects "the right of each individual 'to a private 
enclave where he may lead a private life."' Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 
(1964) (quoting United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1956)); see also 
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973) (stating that the privilege "respects a private 
inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought and proscribes state intrusion to extract self-
condemnation"). For an attempt to see how far privacy can justify the privilege, see Greenawalt, 
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purpose of the privilege, immunity statutes, which allow the state to 
compel testimony from those given immunity from prosecution, 
would be impermissible.72 
In the end, all standard-right justifications of the privilege run 
into the same problem. Consider the argument that the privilege pro-
tects criminal defendants' autonomy.73 According to this justification, 
compelled self-incrimination is morally objectionable because it 
amounts to "self-condemnation on command. "74 Although the state 
may try the defendant, the privilege shows that its "authority [is] not 
absolute: that it stop[ s] short of the point where it might invade [his] 
mind and take dominion of his will."75 
supra note 6, at 20-26, 34-36. Not surprisingly, Greenawalt arrives at something less than the 
Fifth Amendment right. See id. at 59 ("As long as the trial court makes clear that silence is not 
itself proof of guilt, that the prosecution retains the burden of establishing guilt, and that the 
reasonable doubt standard must be met, I believe that restrained judicial comment inviting 
natural adverse inferences should be considered constitutionally acceptable."). 
72. See Amar & Lettow, supra note 7, at 890-91 ("A witness given immunity can be forced 
to testify about anything in his private enclave. This treatment stands in dramatic contrast to the 
true privacy privileges of wife-husband, priest-penitent, doctor-patient, lawyer-client, and so on, 
for which ·no such trumping exists."); William J. Stuntz, Self-Incrimination and Excuse, 88 
COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1234 (1988) (stating that if the privilege were designed to protect privacy, 
it would turn on the nature of the desired disclosure, not the consequences of disclosure). The 
privilege would also extend to testimony in civil cases and nontestimonial evidence in criminal 
cases, both of which often involve embarrassing matters. 
73. See Barbara Allen Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and Effective 
Assistance of Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1138 (1982) ("Our tradition is to mistrust the 
state and create an area of autonomy for each individual, free from the government's malignant 
or benign interference."); Thomas S. Schrock et al., Interrogational Rights: Reflections on 
Miranda v. Arizona, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 49 (1978) ("The fifth amendment, standing for the 
high value placed on personal responsibility, rebukes government when, by omission or com-
mission, it inhibits, stultifies, or interrupts the process by which the accused decides what to do 
about whatever criminal responsibility rests at his doorstep."). 
74. Robert S. Gerstein, The Demise of Boyd: Self-Incrimination and Private Papers in the 
Burger Court, 27 UCLA L. Rev. 343,349 (1979). 
75. Fortas, supra note 6, at 98. Sometimes autonomy and privacy justifications of the privi-
lege are connected. See Richard A. Wasserstrom, Privacy: Some Arguments and Assumptions, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY 317, 322-23 (Ferdinand David Schocman ed., 1984) 
("[T]hc fundamental point is that required disclosure of one's thoughts by itself diminishes the 
concept of individual personhood within the society."). Professor Robert Gerstein, for example, 
has defended the privilege on the theory that criminal defendants have a right to complete con-
trol over their revelations of remorse and self-condemnation. He argues that control over these 
revelations is significant because it allows defendants to assess their actions autonomously. See 
Gerstein, supra note 74, at 349 (stating that compelling revelations of remorse degrades the de-
fendant by "interfer[ing] with the opportunity for autonomous moral development involved in 
coming to terms with [his] own wrongdoing, and denying [his] right to exclusive control of that 
development"); RobertS. Gerstein, Privacy and Self-Incrimination, 80 ETHICS 87,91 (1970) ("It 
is not the disclosure of the facts of the crime, but the mea culpa, the public admission of the pri-
vate judgment of self-condemnation, that seems to be of real concern."); RobertS. Gerstein, 
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The idea that citizens reserve the right to arrive at their own 
moral judgments is certainly plausible. But the privilege fails to corre-
spond to this reserved right. Set aside the obvious fact that a state 
could improperly interfere with citizens' moral judgment other than 
by compelling testimony from them-for example, by brainwashing 
them or by limiting their access to the information and viewpoints 
that they need to arrive at their moral judgments in an autonomous 
and uncoerced fashion. 76 Even if one concentrates on compelled tes-
timony's alleged ability to make citizens turn their backs on their own 
moral beliefs and identify with the government,77 there is no reason to 
assume that this occurs only when the compelled testimony will result 
in criminal prosecution. Compelling an immunized co-conspirator to 
testify against her comrades or compelling a witness to testify against 
a criminal defendant with whom she sympathizes would be equally 
problematic. If the privilege protected one's moral judgment, then 
these people too would have rights of silence. 
Punishment and Self-Incrimination, 16 AM. J. JURIS. 84, 88 (1971) ("We are, in compelling self-
incrimination, weakening the very capacities for self-evaluation and regeneration that we rely 
upon for rehabilitation in punishment."). 
76. Professor Thomas Scanlon has argued that the First Amendment right to free expres-
sion protects autonomy by protecting access to such information and viewpoints. Thomas 
Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 206-07 (1972). Profes-
sor Scanlon has since changed his views on this matter in ways that are unrelated to my argu-
ment. T.M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U. PITI. L. 
REV. 519, 534 (1979) (faulting his earlier theory, the "Millian Principle," for its inability to take 
into account "variations in audience interests under varying circumstances" while maintaining 
that "[mlost of the consequences of the Millian Principle are ones that [he] would still en-
dorse."). 
77. There are plenty of reasons to question whether compelled testimony really has the 
capacity to influence significantly one's moral judgment. Certainly defenders of the privilege, by 
speaking of compelled self-incrimination as "self-condemnation on command," see some anal-
ogy between self-incrimination and brainwashing. But nothing about the state's inquiries into 
the defendant's activities demands that she give up her moral judgment. The state wants her 
information, not her soul. See Dolinko, supra note 7, at 1130: 
If a suspect or a defendant were legally obligated to give truthful answers to questions 
about the alleged crime, his interrogators ... would presumably want answers to the 
kind of factual questions that could establish his guilt ... Why, then, should we be-
lieve that if the interrogators succeed in obtaining a confession, they must necessarily 
have elicited expressions of remorse and self-condemnation from the suspect (espe-
cially when that individual may not feel any remorse at all)? 
Furthermore, even if the influence on the criminal defendant's moral judgment is as great 
as autonomy defenses suggest, it is not clear that the right of autonomy is violated by these 
influences. The fact that one's moral judgment is influenced by one's family and friends 
does not mean that one's autonomy is violated, and the same thing should be true of the 
state's influence on the criminal defendant during trial. 1ndeed, such influence cannot be 
more intrusive than rehabilitative punishment, which is not considered improper. !d. at 
1128 ("The claim [that compelling self-incrimination is degrading] is incompatible with 
[the] advocacy of rehabilitation as a principal goal of the punishment of criminals."). 
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What the privilege protects is not privacy or autonomy, but an 
instrument of self-defense. Silence is protected only when it can be 
used to defend oneself against punishment. For this reason, more so-
phisticated standard-right defenses of the privilege are based on the 
idea that criminal defendants have a reserved right to self-defense. 
The problem with such arguments, however, is how such a reserved 
right is compatible with the government's authority to adjudicate and 
punish violations of the law. 
Consider, for example, Abe Fortas's argument that a state 
founded on the social contract "has no right to compel the sovereign 
individual to surrender or impair his right of self-defense,"7x and that 
the individual has "the sovereign right to refuse to cooperate; to meet 
the state on terms as equal as their respective strength would permit; 
and to defend himself by all means within his power-including the 
instrument of silence. "79 
Fortas is correct that, according to Lockean social contract the-
ory, there is a natural right of self-defense, in the sense that self-
defense is of value independently of its tendency, in the aggregate, to 
make other natural rights more secure. Indeed Locke's argument for 
the social contract is predicated upon the increased number of viola-
tions of natural rights that occur in the state of nature precisely be-
cause people have the right to defend their rights as they see fit. If 
self-defense were of value only to the extent that it protected natural 
rights, people would have a natural duty to give up their power to de-
fend themselves as they see fit to an authority, regardless of their con-
sent.80 
But this natural right of self-defense cannot possibly justify a 
standard constitutional right, for two reasons. First of all, even in the 
state of nature, individuals do not have rights to defend themselves of 
the sort that could justify a right of silence that would be enjoyed by 
everyone suspected of a crime. For example, in the state of nature, 
someone who has violated natural rights may not defend herself 
against a reasonable level of punishment.81 By violating natural rights 
78. Fortas, supra note 6, at 99. 
79. /d. at 98. 
80. Cf DAVID SCHMIDTZ, THE LIMITS OF GOVERNMENT: AN ESSAY ON THE PUBLIC 
GOODS ARGUMENT 38 (1991) (arguing that since one has a right to punish only by the least 
risky acceptable method, even independents remaining in the state of nature have to let the 
state punish for them). 
81. LOCKE, supra note 16, §§ 8, 22, 172, 178, 181. Some defenders of the privilege appeal to 
Hobbes's argument that promises to the sovereign to relinquish one's right to self-defense are 
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she has forfeited her natural rights. Having forfeited these rights, she 
has no ground for defending herself and thus no natural right to si-
lence. 
Accordingly, if there is a right to silence in the state of nature, it 
is a right that only the innocent possess.82 There is no general natural 
right to silence, like the general right to privacy, that even the guilty 
enjoy. And without a general right to silence, there is no standard-
right justification of the privilege. 
Furthermore, those entering civil society would alienate even 
their right to defend themselves against punishment when they were 
not binding. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 114 (J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1983) (1651) ("If a 
man be interrogated by the Soveraign, or his Authority, concerning a crime done by himselfe, 
he is not bound (without assurance of Pardon) to confesse it; because no man ... can be obli-
gated by Covenant to accuse himselfe."); id. at 72 ("A Covenant to accuse ones selfe, without 
assurance of pardon, is ... invalide."); see Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive 
Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 180 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (describing Hobbes as a 
defender of the privilege); Phelps v. Duckworth, 772 F.2d 1410, 1417 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J., 
concurring) (same); Heidt, supra note 68, at 468-69 (same); Sanford Levinson, Testimonial 
Privileges and the Preferences of Friendship, 1984 DUKE L.J. 631, 639 (same). Setting aside the 
fact that Hobbes held a most un-Lockean conception of governmental authority, he is not talk-
ing about a right of self-defense that could justify the privilege against self-incrimination. He 
does not argue that the sovereign has a duty to respect the right of the accused to engage in self-
defense, only that the accused has no duty to the sovereign to confess. Claire Oakes Finkelstein, 
On the Obligation of the State to Extend a Right of Self-Defense to Its Citizens, 147 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1361, 1388-90 (1999) ("The Sovereign has the rights that all persons have in a state of na-
ture, and those rights are unlimited. The natural rights of citizens and the rights of the Sovereign 
can therefore conflict with one another, a point Hobbes repeatedly emphasizes .... ");Green, 
supra note 22, at 678-80 ("[T]he most Hobbes could ever show is that the defendant and the 
sovereign are at war with each other, and that either side may use whatever means are at his 
disposal to prevail without violating the rights of the other."); Jeremy Waldron, Self-Defense: 
Agent-Neutral and Agent-Relative Accounts, 88 CAL. L. REV. 711, 732 (2000) ("Hobbes's doc-
trine of self-defense does not establish that it is wrong for a sovereign to convict, condemn, or 
punish a person for defending himself. His argument establishes only that a person has no obli-
gation to submit to punishment."). For the same reason, Hobbes argued that condemned crimi-
nals may attempt to escape, HOBBES, supra, at 117, but that does not mean that he thought that 
the sovereign has a duty to let them escape. See SIMMONS, supra note 18, at 152 n.16 ("Lacking 
any correlative duty to respect my liberty right, another may be perfectly within her own rights 
in interfering with me."); Waldron, supra, at 728-29 ("The right of nature is certainly not corre-
lated with anyone else's duty to permit or refrain from interfering with the subject's self-
preservation."). Indeed, Hobbes thought the sovereign had no duties to its citizens-it could not 
be accused of injustice even for putting the innocent to death. HOBBES, supra, at 112. 
82. To be sure, compelling everyone in the state of nature, innocent and guilty alike, to 
participate at trial if they are suspected of wrongdoing would make the adjudication and pun-
ishment of rights violations more efficient. But under Lockean contractarian principles, only 
individual consent, and not these positive consequences, could justify the imposition of this bur-
den. Green, supra note 22, at 686-90. For a similar argument, see ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, 
STATE AND UTOPIA 102 (1974) (arguing that a person not subject to the state has the right to 
remain silent at trial if he is innocent of wrongdoing). 
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innocent.83 For it is only by alienating this right that the government is 
given the authority to adjudicate their guilt. If citizens reserved this 
right, the government would be permitted to punish criminal defen-
dants only if they were actually guilty of natural rights violations, not 
if the government came to the legal conclusion that they were guilty. 
Every criminal defendant would simply escape the authority of the 
state if she had done nothing wrong. And that is not the Lockean po-
sition.84 
As a result, within civil society even criminal defendants who are 
innocent of wrongdoing would have no reserved right of silence. The 
only time that a criminal defendant would have such a right is if the 
state were acting outside of its authority, that is, if it failed to protect 
other reserved rights of the defendant. But to argue that the privilege 
exists to handle this contingency is to argue that it is an auxiliary, not 
a standard, right. 
The popular argument that compelled self-incrimination violates 
the defendant's right not to be subjected to the "cruel trilemma of 
self-accusation, perjury or contempt"H5 is, in the end, equivalent to a 
83. Cf Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. 
REV. 1477, 1534 (1999) (proposing that people choosing principles of criminal procedure from 
behind a veil of ignorance would not include the privilege). That even innocents have a moral 
duty to submit to punishment is expressed in the criminal law. Those prosecuted for escaping 
from prison may not bring up their innocence as a defense, but only lack of governmental 
authority to adjudicate guilt. They must show that the conviction is wholly without law and so 
void. People v. Ah Teong, 28 P. 577, 578 (Cal. 1891); cf State v. Brown, 571 A.2d 1367, 1371 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) ("Irregularity in bringing about or maintaining detention, or 
lack of jurisdiction of the committing or detaining authority, shall not be a defense ... if the es-
cape is from a prison or other custodial facility or from detention pursuant to commitment by 
official proceedings."). Blll see Robinson v. Boles, 142 S.E.2d 55, 57-58 (W.Va. 1965) (holding 
that denial of the right to counsel during trial is a valid defense for escape). 
84. See LOCKE, supra note 16, § 129 (arguing that each citizen gives up the right of "doing 
whatsoever he thought fit for the preservation of himself" upon entry into civil society). 
85. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52,55 (1964). For sympathetic accounts of the 
cruel trilemma argument, see JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH AND THE LAW 39 
(1993) ("[Tlhose who defend the protection against compulsory self-incrimination may deem it 
cruel simply to force the individual to 'partake in his own undoing."'); Greenawalt, supra note 6, 
at 36 ("[W]e may hesitate to say that someone has a moral duty to bring conviction and impris-
onment upon himself."); David W. Louisell, Criminal Discovery and Self-Incrimination: Roger 
Traynor Confronts the Dilemma, 53 CAL. L. REV. 89, 95 (1965) (stating that the best justifica-
tion for the privilege is that it is "cruel to make a man an instrument of his own condemna-
tion"). For criticism of the argument, see Amar & Lettow, supra note 7, at 890 (1995) (stating 
that the argument "does not hold water"); Dolinko, supra note 7, at 1093 ("[lnnocent witnesses] 
are often compelled to give evidence in situations that force upon them various other kinds of 
'cruelly' difficult choices"); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Some Kind Words for the Privilege Against 
Self-Incrimination, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 311, 318 (1991) (stating that the trilemma arises only for 
the guilty, and that "we do not permit people to escape hard choices that are a consequence of 
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justification on the basis of a natural right of self-defense. The tri-
lemma is different from what is faced by every subpoenaed witness, 
who will also receive sanctions for perjury or contempt,86 only because 
these sanctions compel criminal defendants, and do not usually com-
pel witnesses, to act contrary to their interest in defending themselves 
against punishment. And that can be a violation of the defendant's 
rights only if there is a reserved right protecting this interest. But 
there is no such right.87 
B. Instrumental-Right Justifications 
If the scope of the privilege fails to correspond to any reserved 
right, the possibility still remains that the privilege is instrumental. 
Giving criminal defendants this right might protect reserved rights in-
directly. 
There are many reasons why the political community might con-
dition its delegation of authority to a government on the existence of 
instrumental rights in the government's constitution. Consider once 
their own voluntary decisions"); Stuntz, supra note 72, at 1237-39 (stressing that the cruelty ra-
tionale is flawed because witnesses, not just the accused, are also forced to make cruel choices). 
86. GRANO, supra note 85, at 38; Vincent Martin Bonventre, An Alternative to the Consti-
tutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 49 BROOK. L. REV. 31,54-55 (1982). 
87. Another popular argument for the privilege is not that the defendant has a right to self-
defense, but that the desire to defend oneself is so overwhelming that the defendant should be 
excused from being placed in a position where she has a legal obligation to overcome it. The 
temptation of the defendant to lie on the stand is so overwhelming that she should not be re-
quired to take the stand at all. See CHARLES TILFORD MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON 
EVIDENCE § 118, at 287 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984) (suggesting that placing a person 
in a position in which he might lie, then punishing him for lying, is intolerable); Stuntz, supra 
note 72, at 1242-92 (arguing that the current view of duress and necessity should be expanded 
and merged to create "a general principle of situational excuse" that justifies the privilege); 
Lane V. Sunderland, Self-Incrimination and Constitutional Principle: Miranda v. Arizona and 
Beyond, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 171, 179-82 (1979) ("[T)he veracity issue notwithstanding .. 
. forcing an individual charged with a crime 'to choose among the three horns of the tricera-
tops-harmful disclosure, contempt, perjury'-is inhumane according to the modern under-
standing of human nature.") One problem with the argument from excuse is that it threatens to 
expand the privilege's scope excessively. If perjury is really excusable, then why not other forms 
of self-defense, for example, destroying evidence, resisting arrest, or escaping from prison? See 
Dolinko, supra note 7, at 1097 ("1t may be 'only natural' to conceal evidence that would subject 
one to criminal punishment, yet we do punish suspects and defendants for destroying evidence, 
suborning perjury, or otherwise seeking to cover up their wrongdoing."). In addition, it is doubt-
ful that perjury is inevitable. By punishing perjurious defendants who are convicted more than 
those who confess, one can make self-incrimination a psychological possibility for a defendant. 
1ndeed, that is the whole point of compelling self-incrimination. An argument from excuse is 
most plausible in cases in which those who confess are put to death-which is rare precisely be-
cause no incentive to confess is thereby created. And even without such incentives, confession is 
not psychologically impossible. Many criminals repent of their crimes. 
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again the right to a trial by jury. The political community would have 
a reason to insist upon this constitutional right, even if the reserved 
moral right to a reasonable and impartial factfinder had been pro-
tected by a standard right like the Due Process Clause, if it feared 
that the government would often be unable to tell whether a fact-
finder was reasonable and impartial. An indirect instrument is the 
best way of assuring that this reserved right is respected in the face of 
governmental ignorance. 
Another reason for instrumental rights is the possibility of gov-
ernmental failure to give standard rights their genuine legal force. 
The political community, recognizing that governments can make 
such mistakes, might demand a second line of defense for reserved 
rights in the form of a constitutional right that indirectly protects re-
served rights. 
But what reason is there to believe that giving criminal defen-
dants the ability to defend themselves against punishment would indi-
rectly protect reserved rights in the face of governmental ignorance or 
mistake? One possibility is that criminal defendants would generally 
use the right of self-defense only when their reserved rights were ac-
tually violated. But even if one assumes, implausibly, that criminal de-
fendants use the privilege only when they think their reserved rights 
are violated, there remains the Lockean principle that they would 
tend to iiiterpret the scope of their own rights too broadly. Criminal 
defendants will simply read their reserved rights in a way that justi-
fied self-defense. The result will not be a coherent alternative to the 
government's protections for reserved rights that could correct its 
mistakes, but only the chaos of the state of nature. Most of the time 
the privilege would simply frustrate legitimate laws, such as those 
prohibiting murder and rape, that do not violate reserved moral 
· h RH ng ts. 
88. BENTHAM, supra note 60, at 237: 
[B)y the effect of this impunity-giving rule, undue suffering has probably in some in-
stances been prevented. Prevented? but to what extent? To the extent of that part of 
the field of penal law which is occupied by bad laws .... Applying with equal force 
and efficiency to all penal laws without distinction, to the worst as well as to the best, 
it at the same time diminishes the efficiency of such as are good .... 
Another reason to question whether the privilege is a proper instrument for the protection of 
reserved rights is that even in those cases where it is properly employed, it frustrates only one 
limited form of evidence gathering in connection with offensive laws. HOOK, supra note 60, at 
63; 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2251, at 313 (McNaughton rev. 1961); Dolinko, supra 
note 7, at 1086-87 (describing privilege as "egregiously overinclusive and patently underinclu-
sive"). 
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But some instrumental justifications of the privilege are based on 
the idea that it can indirectly protect reserved rights despite criminal 
defendants' tendency to use it in a purely self-interested fashion. For 
example, some have argued that the privilege protects reserved rights 
of conscience or free speech by frustrating the enforcement of laws 
that violate these rights. It performs this function because evidence 
that these laws have been violated tends to come from the defen-
dant's own mouth.x9 
The most common instrumental argument for the privilege along 
these lines is that it protects a defendant's reserved right to a system 
of adjudication that reliably separates the guilty from the innocent.90 
In its traditional form this argument is that the privilege prevents the 
conviction of innocent but nervous defendants who might do poorly 
on the stand.91 A more sophisticated version is that the privilege, by 
encouraging guilty defendants to opt for silence, allows innocent de-
fendants to signal their innocence through their willingness to take 
the stand. Denying defendants the privilege would induce guilty de-
fendants to move from silence to false exculpatory statements, 
thereby reducing the credibility of exculpatory statements by the in-
nocent.92 
It is difficult to accept or reject definitively arguments that the 
privilege makes factfinding more reliable.93 But it is significant that 
89. Alan Donagan, The Right Not to Incriminate Oneself, Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y, Spring 1984, 
at 143-47; see McNaughton, supra note 60, at 145-46 (examining the argument that the privilege 
protects First Amendment rights). 
90. Murphy , 378 U.S. at 55 (stating that "the privilege, while sometimes 'a shelter to the 
guilty,' is often 'a protection to the innocent"' (quoting Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 
162 (1955))). 
91. See, e.g. , Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 (1893) ("Excessive timidity . . . will 
often confuse and embarrass him to such a degree as to increase rather than remove prejudices 
against him."); Amar & Lettow, supra note 7, at 900-01 (proposing that even the innocent, 
when flustered, may make seeemingly inculpatory statements); Alfred C. Clapp, Privilege 
Against Self-Incrimination, 10 RUTGERS L. REV. 541, 548 (1956) (stating that innocent defen-
dants, if frightened, might " trip themselves over an inconsistency or contradiction" if on the 
stand); Schulhofer, supra note 85, at 327-33 (defending the privilege for its ability to protect the 
innocent on multiple grounds); Dorsey D. Ellis , Jr., Vox Populi v. Suprema Lex: A Comment on 
the Testimonial Privilege of the Fifth Amendment, 55 IOWA L. REV. 829, 846 (1970) (arguing that 
compelling the innocent to testify is cruel "because of the danger that the jury will convict him 
on the basis of his poor demeanor and performance"). 
92. See Green, supra note 22, at 646-48 (describing but ultimately rejecting this justifica-
tion of privilege). A recent article that is devoted to this argument is Seidmann & Stein, supra 
note 7. 
93. One of the most important empirical questions standing in the way of assessing such 
arguments is whether juries draw adverse inferences from a defendant's silence. Such adverse 
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defenders of the privilege generally believe that it is morally justified 
despite frustrating the truth-seeking functions of the trial. They de-
fend it just as much when factually guilty defendants alone benefit 
from its exercise.94 For this reason, the Supreme Court has rejected 
arguments that the privilege increases the probability that the inno-
cent will be acquitted,95 and academic debate has revolved around 
other arguments.96 
Indeed this resistance to instrumental justifications of the privi-
lege is more general. Defenders of the privilege tend to believe that 
its moral justification is invulnerable to empirical counterargument of 
the type to which instrumental rights are subject. Instead, the privi-
lege, like the Fourth Amendment, protects something that has value 
in itself, independently of its instrumental effects.97 It is for this reason 
that standard-right defenses of the privilege are so common, despite 
the difficulties that they face. 
inferences are obviously possible notwithstanding constitutional requirements, under Griffin v. 
California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) and its progeny, that juries not draw such inferences. On the 
problem of adverse inferences for instrumental argument for the privilege generally, see 
Dolinko, supra note 7, at 1074-75. On the inability of the signaling argument to work if juries 
draw such inferences, see Green, supra note 22, at 646-48. For evidence that juries do draw ad-
verse inferences, see id. at 642-43 n.51 (citing articles). Professors Daniel Seidmann and Alex 
Stein offer as evidence that jurors do not draw adverse inferences the fact that, after the passage 
in England of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, c. 33, §§ 34-38 (Eng.), which al-
lowed adverse inferences from silence, the rate at which defendants responded to interrogation 
in the police station and testified at trial increased. This change suggests that factfinders were 
not drawing adverse inferences when they were legally prohibited from doing so. Seidmann & 
Stein, supra note 7, at 484-95, 501-02 (citing TOM BUCKE ET AL., THE RIGHT OF SILENCE: THE 
IMPACT OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND PUBLIC ORDER ACT OF 1994 (2000)). The evidence 
concerning analogous changes in Singapore is, however, to the contrary. After adverse infer-
ences were allowed, the already small percentage of defendants who remained silent actually 
increased. Meng Heong Yeo, Diminishing the Right to Silence: The Singapore Experience, 1983 
CRIM. L. REV. 89, 96-99. 
94. See Dolinko, supra note 7, at 1066-67 (stating that recent discussions of the privilege 
are partial to "individual rather than systemic rationales"); Seidmann & Stein, supra note 7, at 
435-36 (examining arguments based on rights such as privacy, individualism, and free agency). 
95. Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. 406, 413-15 (1966); see also Allen v. lllinois, 478 U.S. 
364, 375 (1986) ("The privilege against self-incrimination ... is not designed to enhance the reli-
ability of the factfinding determination."). 
96. See Dolinko, supra note 7, at 1066-67 (noting that authors in recent discussions have 
tended toward rights-based reasoning, perhaps in response to the "vacuous, rhetorical nature" 
of past reliance on systemic rationales). 
97. See supra notes 71-79 and accompanying text. 
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C. Auxiliary-Right Justifications 
An auxiliary-right approach to the privilege nicely captures these 
intuitions. As I have already illustrated, auxiliary rights are easily con-
fused with standard rights.98 Like a standard right, an auxiliary privi-
lege would not be justified by its instrumental effects, but because it 
directly protects a reserved natural right, namely, the right to engage 
in self-defense when one's other reserved rights are violated. It would 
not matter that, in the aggregate, exercise of this right failed to in-
crease the likelihood that reserved rights would be protected. Unlike 
a standard right however, the scope of an auxiliary privilege would 
fail to correspond with the scope of any moral right that could be le-
gitimately exercised by all those who assert the privilege. It is simply 
false that all criminal defendants may justifiably engage in self-
defense against punishment. Only those whose rights have been vio-
lated by the government may legitimately use silence to defend them-
selves.99 But because the government cannot selectively provide the 
privilege only to those whose resistance to its laws it believes is le-
gitimate without asserting absolute authority, rights of self-defense 
are provided to all criminal defendants, regardless of the merits of 
their resistance. 
An auxiliary privilege can also be confused with an instrumental 
privilege that corrects governmental ignorance or mistake, for both 
rights are about protecting reserved rights when the government fails 
to do so. But according to an auxiliary-right interpretation, the pur-
pose of the privilege is not that, in the aggregate, it will increase the 
chances that reserved moral rights will be protected. Its reason for 
existence is that it directly protects citizens' reserved right to defend 
themselves as they see fit when the government has violated their 
other reserved rights, in a manner unlimited by considerations of its 
long-term effects. 
Consider the example of the privilege's invocation before the 
House Un-American Activities Committee, which is inevitably 
pointed out as a paradigmatic example of the privilege fulfilling its 
moral purpose.100 On the one hand, defenders of the privilege might 
be drawn to this example because they accept the argument that the 
privilege, in the aggregate, tends to protect reserved rights to free 
98. See supra Section I. B. 
99. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text. 
100. See GRISWOLD, supra note 14, at 10-13, 14-18 (defending the privilege against self-
incrimination in light of McCarthy-era anticommunism); Fortas, supra note 6, at 101-04 (same). 
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speech. On the other hand, the question of the privilege's long-run ef-
fects might be irrelevant. The point of the example could instead sim-
ply be that without the privilege, this legitimate defense of free 
speech would have received no legal protection. As a result, the gov-
ernment would have been asserting absolute authority over the 
criminal defendant-an authority unconstrained by reserved rights. 
I believe that the auxiliary-right argument stands behind many 
intuitions in favor of the privilege. Consider the following argument 
by Professor Kevin Reitz: 
The suspect's passivity is tolerated ... because we hold deep-seated 
doubts concerning the moral perfection of our criminal justice sys-
tem, and we correspondingly respect the right of the individual ac-
cused to question the criminal law's application to him .... Skepti-
cism of this kind is perhaps more strongly felt by a criminal suspect 
than by members of the general public, but its experience is not so 
limited. Americans have a profound and historic distrust for the use 
of governmental coercive power through the criminal process, and 
this perspective cannot be dismissed as an artifact of the eighteenth 
Jbi 
century. 
Professor Reitz argues that the privilege is a response to the possibil-
ity that the government's best efforts may nevertheless fail to protect 
reserved rights. But he offers no reason to believe that the privilege is 
a good method for correcting these mistakes. He cannot seriously be 
arguing that the criminal defendant's views are, in general, more 
likely to be correct than the government's. A foundational premise of 
Lockean social contract theory is that people tend to read their own 
rights too broadly. Each defendant will read her reserved rights in a 
manner that benefits her case. The result will not be a coherent alter-
native account of reserved rights that could function as a check on the 
government, but simply the anarchy of the state of nature-anarchy 
that increases the likelihood that individuals' natural rights will be 
violated. 
So what does it mean for the privilege to be the product of "re-
spect" for the criminal defendant's attempts to protect her reserved 
rights? I believe that Professor Reitz, like so many other defenders of 
the privilege, is arguing that the privilege is necessary to protect an 
avenue for legitimate civil disobedience. Unless the government gives 
101. Kevin R. Reitz, Clients, Lawyers and the Fifth Amendment: The Need for a Projected 
Privilege, 41 DUKE L.J. 572, 582 (1991) (footnote omitted). 
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the defendant a weapon to defend what she thinks are her reserved 
rights, the government's authority over the defendant is absolute. Of 
course, the government may give the defendant many legal entitle-
ments-to due process, privacy, free speech, and so on. But if it may 
forbid her resistance if she believes that these rights are inadequate, 
its authority is still absolute. It has the authority to decide the limits of 
its authority, which is to say that its authority has no limits at all. 
Abe Fortas's defense of the privilege can also be interpreted as 
an auxiliary-right argument. He argues that the privilege is a conse-
quence of the Lockean view that "a sovereign state ... has no right to 
compel the sovereign individual to surrender or impair his right of 
self-defense."'02 As I have demonstrated, this fails as a standard-right 
justification, since one has a natural right to defend oneself against 
punishment only if one is innocent-and even the innocent's right to 
self-defense would be alienated upon entering civil society. 103 To enter 
civil society is to accept the state's authority to adjudicate and punish, 
which means accepting the state's decisions even if they are wrong. 
And yet, to say that one alienates one's rights upon entering the 
social contract does not mean that this alienation is without limits. 
Locke makes it clear that it is not possible for an individual to give to 
the government the right to do with her whatever it wills. 104 I cannot 
consent to be a slave, that is, someone who can be permissibly killed 
or harmed for any reason. 105 And if unlimited political authority ex-
isted, I would be the government's slave-with only the rights that it 
chose to give to me. 
There must be some reserved rights even within civil society. Al-
though Locke himself is not that explicit about the extent of these re-
served rights, he makes it clear that they follow from the fact that the 
alienation of natural rights is a voluntary decision made according to 
the self-interest of those leaving the state of nature.'06 No one would 
consent to be a slave, because "no rational creature can be supposed 
102. Fortas, supra note 6, at 99. 
103. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text. 
104. LOCKE, supra note 16, §§ 23, 85, 135, 149, 168, 172, 189. 
105. !d. §§ 17, 22-23, 91, 149; SIMMONS, supra note 18, at 50. The foundation for Locke's 
argument against voluntary slavery is the idea that "[n]obody can give more power than he has 
himself; and he that cannot take away his own life cannot give another power over it." LOCKE, 
supra note 16, § 23; see also id. §§ 24, 135, 149, 168, 172. I cannot give someone the right to kill 
me, because I have no right to kill myself. I have no right to kill myself because I am, in essence, 
owned by God. 
106. !d. §§ 134, 137. 
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to change his condition with an intention to be worse."107 And if a citi-
zen's reserved rights are violated, she reenters the state of nature and 
may reassert her natural right to defend herself, even if the aggregate 
effect of individuals' engaging in self-help is a reduction in the level of 
security for all. 
So Fortas is right: there remains a reserved right of self-defense 
even in civil society. It is the natural right to resist the state when it 
exceeds its authority. And Fortas is also right that the privilege is 
necessary to protect this reserved right. It is not enough for the gov-
ernment to give expression to what it believes are the limits on its 
authority. If a government that believes that it has adequately pro-
tected reserved rights has no duty to give criminal defendants powers 
to resist its laws, then any claim that its authority is limited by re-
served rights must ring hollow. Its authority cannot be limited by re-
served rights if it has the authority to forbid individuals from pro-
tecting these rights. Without the privilege, no one is a citizen; 
everyone is a slave. 
This explains why so many defenders of the privilege believe that 
without it the trial becomes a form of "debasement"108 and "subordi-
nation of the self to the state."109 It does not matter how solicitous the 
government is of the defendant's rights. Without the privilege the fact 
remains that the only views about reserved rights that matter are the 
government's. To avoid this, one must reintroduce the state of nature 
into the criminal trial, by allowing the defendant to maintain a "com-
bative" or "adversarial" relationship. 110 
107. /d. § 131; see also id. § 137 ("It cannot be supposed that [people) should intend ... to 
give to any one, or more, an absolute arbitrary power over their persons and estates .... This 
were to put themselves into a worse position than the state of nature, wherein they had a liberty 
to defend their right against the injuries of others."). 
108. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 261 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). 
109. LUBAN, supra note 68, at 194. 
110. This explains the tendency of defenders of the privilege to rely on martial metaphors. 
DAMASKA, supra note 10, at 126 (stating that the privilege has its source in the idea that "a 
party to a contest should not be compelled to become telum adversarii sui, that is, an offensive 
weapon of his adversary"); 8 WIGMORE, supra note 88, § 2251, at 318 ("[The privilege] 
compl[ies] with the prevailing ethic that the individual is sovereign and that proper rules of bat-
tle between government and individual require that the individual ... not be conscripted by his 
opponent to defeat himself."); Fortas, supra note 6, at 98 ("The principle that a man is not 
obliged to furnish the state with ammunition to use against him is basic to this conception. 
Equals, meeting in battle, owe no such duty to one another, regardless of the obligations that 
they may be under prior to battle."); cf. John Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure or A 
Third "Model" of the Criminal Process, 79 YALE L.J. 359,378-79 (1970) (drawing a relationship 
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But just as protecting the criminal defendant's attempts at self-
defense is necessary to avoid absolutism, it is also incompatible with 
the authority of the state. One cannot give to the criminal defendant a 
right to resist the state only when her reserved rights are violated. 111 
One must instead give her the right to protect her rights as she sees 
fit. And in so doing, one has created an avenue for her to escape the 
state's legitimate authority. The privilege reintroduces the very anar-
chy that it was the job of the social contract to end. Instead of pro-
tecting reserved rights, it increases the likelihood that our natural 
rights will be violated. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that critics of the privilege reject it 
as anarchistic. It is incoherent, they argue, for the government to ap-
ply the criminal law to the defendant, thereby manifesting its view 
that it has legitimate authority over her, while giving her an avenue to 
frustrate its exercise of this authority. 112 The privilege is contrary to 
the "duty of citizenship," that is, the defendant's obligation to submit 
to the government's procedures for adjudicating and punishing 
crimes.113 To be sure, if she chooses to engage in civil disobedience by 
remaining silent on the stand, there may be little the government can 
do to compel her to speak. But because the government has the 
authority to forbid civil disobedience, she should expect not legal pro-
tection, but contempt sanctions. 
D. The Privilege's Incoherent Scope 
Virtually everyone agrees that the courts have been unable to 
delineate the privilege's scope in a conceptually satisfying way. The 
Supreme Court "zigs, zags, and balances, ad hoc."114 The result is "an 
inconsistent combination of difficult-to-justify broad rules and a 
hodgepodge of miscellaneous exceptions." 115 But the privilege's inco-
between adversarial criminal procedure, including the privilege against self-incrimination, and 
the "battle model," which conceives "of the criminal as a special kind of person who is the 'en-
emy' of society, and of the trial as a battle in which (if guilty) he is vanquished"). For a more 
thorough discussion of the relationship between the privilege and the morality of warfare, see 
Green, supra note 22, at 706-12. 
111. See supra pp. 125-26. 
112. Dolinko, supra note 7, at 1144-45, 1126--27. 
113. Amar & Lettow, supra note 7, at 892; cf Friendly, supra note 60, at 679-80 (contrasting 
the privilege with circumstances outside the courtroom in which "[tlhose who are questioned 
feel themselves to be morally bound to respond"). 
114. Amar & Lettow, supra note 7, at 872. 
115. Witt, supra note 59, at 908; see also EASTON, supra note 59, at 207-35 (criticizing the 
case law on the privilege as incoherent). 
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herent scope is not the Supreme Court's fault. The fault lies with the 
paradox of auxiliary rights. This can be seen by considering one of the 
many puzzling distinctions employed in Fifth Amendment jurispru-
dence-the distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial evi-
dence. 
The privilege prohibits "compel(ling a person]" in any criminal 
case "to be a 'witness' against himself." Under current interpretations 
of the Fifth Amendment, one is compelled to be a witness only if 
compelled to produce evidence of a testimonial nature, that is, only if 
the compelled act "explicitly or implicitly, relate(s] a factual assertion 
or disclose(s] information."116 As a result, the privilege is not impli-
cated by the government's seizure of a defendant's business records, 
because nothing about the seizure compels the defendant to perform 
a testimonial-or indeed any-act. And to the extent that she per-
formed testimonial acts when creating the records, she did so volun-
tarily.117 Although she might have been a witness, she was not a com-
pelled one. 
In general, even requiring the defendant herself to turn over in-
criminating physical or documentary evidence will not implicate the 
privilege, because the act of turning over the evidence communicates 
nothing. Only if this act communicates something novel and self-
incriminatory (for example, that the evidence is authentic) will she be 
able to take advantage of the privilege. 118 
116. Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201,210 (1988). 
L17. United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612 (1984) (holding that the defendant's business 
papers were not protected because they were voluntarily prepared). An unresolved wrinkle is 
whether this rule applies to private papers, something expressly left open by the Supreme Court. 
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 414 (1976). All but two circuits have accepted this natural 
extension of the theory. See, e.g., United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d 552, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 
(per curiam), affd, 530 U.S. 27 (2000); Barrett v. Acevedo, 169 F.3d 1155, 1168 (8th Cir. 1999); 
United States v. Feldman, 83 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 1996); 1n re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Te-
cum, 1 F.3d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Wujkowski, 929 F.2d 981, 983 (4th Cir. 1991 ); 
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 759 F.2d 1418, 1419 (9th Cir. 1985). But see, e.g., 1n re Grand Jury 
Proceedings, 55 F.3d 1012, 1013-14 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (stating that the contents of 
personal papers may be protected by the Fifth Amendment); 1n re Grand Jury Proceedings, 632 
F.2d 1033, L043 (3d Cir. 1980) (same). The more complicated situation of the government's sei-
zure of records that the defendant was required by law to generate can be ignored here. See, 
e.g., Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 48-60 (1968) (preventing the prosecution from us-
ing tax documents the defendant was required to keep under federal wagering tax statutes); 
Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1968) (precluding the use by the prosecution of 
documents obtained from the defendant as a result of wagering excise tax provisions). 
118. Fisher v. U.S., 425 U.S. 391,410-13 (1976). 
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There are good reasons to criticize the way the Supreme Court 
has applied this distinction. The Court has held, for example, that 
voice exemplars are nontestimonial, since it is only the phonetic char-
acter of the compelled speech, rather than the information conveyed 
by it, that is relevant.119 But to provide a voice exemplar is to choose 
one's own voice out of the infinite number of alternatives. One could, 
after all, choose one's best imitation of James Dean. This act of 
choice is testimonial because it informs that what one chooses is 
authentic. 
By the same token, a defendant forced to present herself for 
identification by witnesses is compelled to perform a testimonial act 
because she is required to choose her own image over others. Admit-
tedly, the defendant's ability to choose an inauthentic image is lim-
ited. The most she could do is scrunch up her face or affect a hunch-
back. Furthermore, in some cases, such as blood samples, the 
defendant simply may be unable to offer anything but the genuine ar-
ticle. But it is hard to see how compelling self-incrimination should 
become constitutionally permissible simply because the defendant 
finds it difficult to lie. Compulsion remains compulsion even if one 
has a limited ability to resist. 
But the tortured details of the distinction between testimonial 
and nontestimonial evidence are not my concern here. The more fun-
damental question is why the distinction is relevant at all to the scope 
of the privilege. The locus classicus on this issue is Schmerber v. Cali-
fornia/20 where the Court used the distinction to deny Fifth Amend-
ment protections to criminal suspects compelled to provide blood 
samples. 
The Schmerber Court explicitly declined to rely on the textual 
argument, which is unlikely to have succeeded anyway,121 that it sim-
ply follows from the meaning of the word that a "witness" provides 
testimonial evidence. 122 It instead sought to explain this limit in terms 
of the moral rights the privilege protects. These rights included the 
criminal defendant's "dignity and integrity" and the "inviolability of 
the human personality" (that is, something like privacy and auton-
119. United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 34-35 (2000); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 
218,222-23 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967). 
120. 384 u.s. 757 (1966). 
121. See Richard A. Nagareda, Compulsion "To Be a Witness" and the Resurrection of 
Boyd, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1575, 1603-23 (1999) (critiquing the textual argument). 
122. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 761 n.6 ("[The decision) cannot turn on the Fifth Amendment's 
use of the word 'witness."'). 
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omy), as well as his right, under "our accusatory system of criminal 
justice," to engage in self-defense by refusing to participate in the 
adjudication of his guilt. 123 According to the Court, the privilege "de-
mands that the government seeking to punish an individual produce 
the evidence against him by its own independent labors, rather than 
by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his own 
mouth."124 
But the Court admitted that if these moral rights were taken 
completely seriously, the privilege's scope would be unacceptably 
broad: "If the scope of the privilege coincided with the complex of 
values it helps to protect, we might be obliged to conclude that the 
privilege was violated."125 It justified setting aside these rights with re-
spect to nontestimonial evidence, because a broader privilege carried 
excessive social costs.126 
There is certainly nothing suspect about determining the scope of 
a constitutional right by looking to its costs. This is precisely how the 
scope of the Fourth Amendment is determined. As a standard consti-
tutional right, the Fourth Amendment's scope is determined by 
looking to the scope of the reserved moral right that it protects. And 
the scope of the right of privacy is determined, in part, by the social 
costs of protecting intimate facts. 127 Why is a police officer in hot pur-
suit of a suspect not forbidden under the Fourth Amendment from 
following the suspect into her home?128 The reason is that her right of 
123. /d. at 762. 
124. /d. 
125. /d.; see also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 245 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting in 
part and concurring in part) (positing that compelling a suspect to appear in a lineup and to 
speak certain words given him by the police violates the privilege); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772-
78 (Warren, Douglas, and Fortas, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that it was a violation of the peti-
tioner's constitutional rights against self-incrimination to compel him to give a blood sample for 
the purposes of proving his guilt). 
126. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 449 (1971) (Harlan, J. concurring in the judgment); 
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 762-63; id. at 778 (Warren, J. dissenting); cf Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 
511, 523-24 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting.) ("In federal cases stemming from Fifth Amendment 
claims, the Court has chiefly derived its standards from consideration of two factors: the history 
and purpose of the privilege and the character and urgency of the other public interests in-
volved."). 
127. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985) (holding that the Fourth 
Amendment's scope is a question of balancing the individual's expectations of privacy against 
the government's need to keep public order); Stuntz, supra note 72, at 1236-37 (discussing the 
way courts balance an individual's privacy interest against the state's interests). 
128. U.S. v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976) (upholding warrantless entry and arrest be-
cause police were in hot pursuit and had probable cause to arrest suspect on drug charges); 
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (upholding a warrantless entry and arrest be-
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privacy does not extend that far, because the costs of respecting her 
interest in concealing intimate facts would simply be too great. It is 
not as if her right of privacy is simply ignored because of the costs; the 
scope of her right of privacy is determined by these costs. 
But the consideration of social cost that gave rise to the testimo-
nial/nontestimonial distinction in Schmerber cannot be understood 
along Fourth Amendment lines. First of all, if the scope of the privi-
lege is a question of cost/benefit balancing, then courts should deter-
mine its scope by actually engaging in this balancing, not by fastening 
on the distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial evidence. 
To be sure, there is some merit to relying on rules of thumb, instead 
of figuring out the scope of a constitutional right on a case-by-case 
basis. Even in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, general rules-for 
example, concerning trash cans and motor homes-are applied. 129 But 
these are rough approximations of case-by-case balancing. And there 
is no reason-nor did the Schrnerber court try to give a reason-to 
believe that the testimonial/nontestimonial distinction even roughly 
approximates case-by-case balancing. Given that the costs of pro-
tecting testimonial evidence are often great (a serial killer is put back 
on the streets who would be behind bars if the state could only com-
pel her to take the stand at trial) and the benefits of refusing to pro-
tect nontestimonial evidence often negligible (the state may compel 
the defendant to turn over reams of documentary evidence that 
makes little difference to the success of its case), one would expect 
any rule of thumb to cut across the testimonial/nontestimonial divide. 
It is as if the Court, recognizing that balancing in Fourth Amendment 
cases was necessary, arbitrarily concluded that motor homes were en-
titled to unlimited Fourth Amendment protection and everything else 
got no protection at all. 
It is for this reason that the distinction has been criticized as 
"lacking an organizing principle" 130 and as a form of "balancing with-
out structure, [which] explains all results equally well; it is not so 
much a positive theory as a confession that no positive theory ex-
cause a delay in the investigation by the police would have gravely endangered their lives and 
the lives of others). 
129. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988) (holding that evidence disposed of 
in garbage cans will not be accorded the same level of privacy as evidence found in one's dwell-
ing); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392-94 (1985) (holding that evidence found in motor 
homes will not be accorded the same level of privacy as evidence found in one's dwelling). 
130. Seidmann & Stein, supra note 7. at 475. 
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ists. "131 It is not enough to know that a line must be drawn. There 
must be some reason why the line is drawn where it is-a reason put 
in terms of the limits of the moral rights the privilege is supposed to 
protect. 
But the Court failed to do justice to these moral rights, not be-
cause it was lazy or confused, but because it had no choice. On the 
one hand, the Court could not determine the scope of the privilege by 
looking to the scope of the defendant's rights to privacy or autonomy, 
for the privilege simply cannot be seen as protecting these rights.132 If 
it did, then there would be no reason to limit the scope of the privi-
lege to testimony that was incriminating. The only option was to look 
to the defendant's right of self-defense. 
But the only unalienated right to self-defense that the defendant 
has is the right to resist the state when it is violating her other re-
served rights. If the privilege protects this right, then it is auxiliary. 
And if one did justice to this reserved right, the privilege's scope 
would take on anarchistic dimensions. Criminal defendants engaged 
in legitimate civil disobedience may do far more than remain silent at 
trial. They may decide not to turn over nontestimonial evidence (in-
cluding blood samples), refuse to show themselves to witnesses, and, 
in all likelihood, escape from custodial detention and lie on the stand. 
Once one accepts that legitimate civil disobedience needs protection, 
there is no acceptable stopping point. Since this principled position is 
unacceptable, the Court had no choice but to settle upon a limitation 
that is unprincipled. 
Of course, as the costs of protecting civil disobedience increase, 
they will become so intolerable that one will be compelled to draw a 
limit. But where one stops will not do justice to the right to civil dis-
obedience, the way the Fourth Amendment's limits do justice to the 
right of privacy. One cannot justifiably say to the person prosecuted 
for being a Catholic that she may remain silent, but not refuse to turn 
over documents, because allowing her the latter right is "too costly." 
By reserving a right against religious discrimination, she also reserved 
the right to protect herself if she was discriminated against-no mat-
ter how inconvenient this might be for the government. 
It is for this reason that Justice Fortas, although dismissing the 
distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial evidence as un-
related to the privilege's moral purposes, was himself compelled to 
131. Stuntz, supra note 72, at 1237. 
132. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text. 
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draw his own arbitrary limit, to keep the privilege from taking on an-
archistic dimensions: 
[T]he exhibition of the person of the accused at a lineup is not itself 
a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination. In itself, it is 
no more subject to constitutional objection than the exhibition of 
the person of the accused in the courtroom for identification pur-
poses. It is an incident of the State's power to arrest, and a reason-
able and justifiable aspect of the State's custody resulting from ar-
rest. It does not require that the accused takes affirmative, volitional 
action, but only that, having been duly arrested, he may be seen for 
identification purposes. 133 
Set aside the fact that exhibiting oneself in a lineup and in court in-
volves a whole host of affirmative volitional acts, most notably the act 
of honest demeanor. Even if one were utterly passive in such cases, 
the question still remains why being compelled to be the passive 
source of evidence against oneself is outside the scope of the Fifth 
Amendment. If the Fifth Amendment exists to protect legitimate civil 
disobedience, then there is no reason why disobedience through re-
fusal to present oneself in a lineup or in court should not also be pro-
tected. To say, as Justice Fortas does, that compelling a defendant to 
participate in a lineup is "a reasonable and justifiable aspect of the 
State's custody" is no explanation at all, but simply the same unprin-
cipled "balancing" that the majority used in Schmerber. Since only an 
unacceptably broad scope for the privilege can be arrived at on prin-
cipled grounds, an unprincipled balancing is the best that anyone can 
do. 
The distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial evidence 
is far from being the only conceptually unsupported distinction em-
ployed, either explicitly or implicitly, in determining the privilege's 
scope. The Court has held, for example, that a jury must be instructed 
not to draw adverse inferences concerning guilt from the defendant's 
silence, because such adverse inferences are a "penalty ... for exer-
cising a constitutional privilege."134 But juries are routinely allowed to 
draw positive inferences concerning those defendants who choose to 
133. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 259-60 (1967) (Fortas, J. concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
134. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965); see also Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 
288, 305 (1981) (stating that a "no inference from silence" instruction is required by the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments). 
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testify, 135 and forgoing this positive inference is just as much a deter-
rent to exercising the privilege as receiving an adverse inference. A 
distinction (between a penalty and the failure to provide a benefit) is 
drawn to keep the privilege's scope from expanding too far, but no 
reason for the distinction is available. 
The literature on the privilege is filled with criticisms of this lack 
of clarity concerning its scope. 136 Academics have repeatedly taken 
the courts to task for failing to assess the privilege's reach in the light 
of a coherent account of its moral purpose. The assumption, of 
course, is that this is possible. The problem is that it is not. In the next 
Part, I argue that the same problem arises concerning that other con-
stitutional protection of self-defense: the Second Amendment. 
Ill. THE PARADOX AND THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 
The Second Amendment is easily the most controversial provi-
sion in the Bill of Rights. Unlike the privilege, whose moral justifica-
tion is primarily a matter of genteel academic debate, the controversy 
over the Second Amendment is played out in newspapers and politi-
cal campaigns. But the intractable qualities of the two debates are 
similar. Just as critics of the privilege argue that it gives criminal de-
fendants a tool to frustrate the government's legitimate attempts to 
adjudicate and punish crimes, critics of the Second Amendment argue 
that it gives individuals a tool to frustrate the government's legitimate 
attempts to reduce violence. 137 Both argue that these rights incoher-
ently reintroduce the state of nature into civil society. On the other 
hand, Second Amendment advocates are very much like defenders of 
135. The constitutional permissibility of these positive inferences has been questioned only 
when there is a silent co-defendant who might be directly harmed through such comparisons. 
See, e.g., United States v. Petullo, 709 F.2d 1178, 1182 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that a statement 
by counsel asking the jury only to draw favorable inferences from the defendant's willingness to 
testify need not be prejudicial to a co-defendant who did not testify); United States v. Hines, 455 
F.2d 1317, l334-35 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (holding that even though the defendant's counsel asked 
the jury to draw a favorable inference from the defendant 's willingness to testify, such a state-
ment was not inherently prejudicial to the silent co-defendant, and merely required judge's in-
struction); United States v. Blue, 440 F.2d 300, 302-03 (7th Cir. 1971) (permitting comments 
referencing the fact that a co-defendant took the stand, even though he was not required to do 
so); United States v. Hutul, 416 F.2d 607, 621-22 (7th Cir. 1969) (permitting the defendant's 
counsel to comment that he acted in good faith and was the only one of the defendants to testify 
in the case); 8 J . MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAC!"ICE 'l\ 14.04[2][c] (2d ed. 1981) (describing 
the positive inference as one of several ways in which one co-defendant's testimony can be 
deemed prejudicial to silent co-defendant). 
136. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text. 
137. See infra notes 172-73 and accompanying text. 
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the privilege in believing that protecting self-defense is an essential 
constraint on governmental authority. 
The irresolvable nature of the debate over the right to bear arms 
is due to the paradox of auxiliary rights. This is because the right to 
bear arms, like the privilege, is conceived of as auxiliary. As a result, 
the questions of its moral justifiability and scope will never be able to 
be resolved satisfactorily. The difficulty is not disagreement on politi-
cal principles, for both supporters and critics of the right can each ap-
peal to Locke. The problem is that the same Lockean principles gen-
erate persuasive arguments for and against the right. 
Once again, my goal is not to canvass all possible justifications of 
the right to bear arms and show, on the basis of the historical evi-
dence,138 that an auxiliary justification is the only viable one. All I can 
do here is outline the possible moral justifications (political, standard, 
instrumental, and auxiliary) and show how the latter best captures 
core intuitions held by many of its supporters. 
A. Political-Right Justifications 
Much academic debate concerning the Second Amendment has 
revolved around the argument that arms ensure the majoritarian trust 
through which a political community gives a government authority. 
They do this by giving the community the power to withdraw this 
trust through revolution.139 This is the right to bear arms as Black-
stone conceived it, with the twist that the protection for majoritarian-
ism is enshrined in a countermajoritarian constitutional right. 140 Like 
the right to vote, the right to bear arms is a political right. 
138. Although the legislative history of the Second Amendment is considerably more robust 
than the legislative history of the privilege, e.g., United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 218-20 
(5th Cir. 2001); MALCOLM, supra note 35, at 134-61; Bogus, supra note 12, at 322-75; David B. 
Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 BYU L. REV. 1359, passim, I 
will not discuss it here. My goal is making moral sense of the various interpretations of the Sec-
ond Amendment that have been argued for on the basis of the historical record. 
139. AMAR, supra note 32, at 47-49; Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amend-
ment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 649 (1989); Lund, supra note 35, at 111-17; Brent J. Mcintosh, The 
Revolutionary Second Amendment, 51 ALA. L. REV. 673, 679-81 (2000). 
140. I will not spend time discussing those Second Amendment skeptics who question the 
likelihood that a tyrannical regime will arise, Bellesiles, supra note 8, at 250, as well as the use-
fulness of small arms as a means of resisting a tyrant who controls the military power of the 
United States. For discussion of these issues see Wendy Brown, Guns, Cowboys, Philadelphia 
Mayors, and Civic Republicanism: On Sanford Levinson's The Embarrassing Second Amend-
ment, 99 YALE L.J. 661, 665 (1989); Mcintosh, supra note 139, at 696; Elaine Scarry, War and 
the Social Contract: Nuclear Policy, Distribution, and the Right to Bear Arms, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 
1257, 1268-86 (1991 ). 
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So understood, the right does not protect, either directly or indi-
rectly, natural rights that individuals have reserved against the politi-
cal community. It instead protects the political community itself 
against a tyrannical minority. 141 As a result, it need extend only as far 
as is necessary to allow one to engage in a popular revolt. It would 
not be a flaw in an interpretation of the Amendment's scope that it 
failed to put guns in the hands of citizens for self -defense. 142 A law 
that required all ammunition to be kept in a sealed container that 
could be broken only in the event of a popular rebellion and for no 
other reason (even if a violent intruder invaded one's home) would 
stand a good chance of passing constitutional muster. 
Many Second Amendment advocates resist political-right inter-
pretations, precisely because they fail to protect the use of arms in 
self-defense. 143 They argue that , like other provisions in the Bill of 
Rights, the Second Amendment exists to protect the reserved moral 
rights of individuals against the political community. To use the 
(somewhat unfortunate) terms within which this debate is often 
framed, it is an individual and not merely a collective right. 
Speaking of the right to bear arms as an individual right can be 
misleading. The dispute between individual- and collective-right in-
terpretations is not a dispute about whether individuals have standing 
to assert Second Amendment claims. To be sure, some courts have 
accepted arguments that states alone have standing to invoke the 
right, beca:'tlse, they argue, it exists solely to assure that state militias 
remain armed. 144 But there is nothing about a collective-right interpre-
tation of the Second Amendment as I have understood it that would 
deny individuals standing to assert the right. This can be seen by 
comparing the Second Amendment with another political right-the 
141. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. 
142. See AMAR, supra note 32, at 47-49 (arguing that the right to bear arms was intended to 
be interpreted within the context of popular revolution); Akhil Reed Amar, Forward: The 
Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 127 (2000) (" Intratextually, when the Con-
stitution speaks of ' the people' rather than 'persons,' the collective connotation is primary. 'We 
the People ' in the Preamble, establish the Constitution as public citizens meeting together in 
conventions and acting in concert, not as private individuals."). 
143. See Brannon P. Denning, Gun Shy: The Second Amendment as an "Underenforced 
Constitutional Norm," 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL' Y 719,730 (1998) (describing how many Sec-
ond Amendment opponents have used the "political right" interpretation as a way to deny 
standing to Second Amendment claimants); Nelson Lund, The Past and Future of the Individ-
ual's Right to Bear Arms, 31 GA. L. REV. 1, 31 n.72 (1996) (disputing interpretions of the Sec-
ond Amendment as solely a political right to insurrection) . 
144. E.g., Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98, 100-01 (9th Cir. 1996). In this Article, I assume that 
a states-right interpretation of the Second Amendment is wrong. 
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right to vote. Although the right to vote is also collective in the sense 
that it exists to ensure that the government retains the political com-
munity's trust, it would be absurd to say that, for that reason, only the 
political community or the states-and not the individual-have 
standing to invoke the right. 
Likewise, it should not be taken to follow from the collective-
right approach that the Second Amendment does not give each indi-
vidual a legal entitlement to bear arms when a more restrictive distri-
bution of arms can ensure that the political community's voice is 
heard. It is true that Professor Akhil Amar, one of the most promi-
nent defenders of the collective-right interpretation, has argued that 
the purposes of the Second Amendment might be satisfied simply by 
ensuring that the armed forces are representative of the general 
population.145 But that is like saying that purposes of the right to vote 
might be satisfied by giving the members of those same representative 
armed forces exclusive authority to determine who holds governmen-
tal power. Simply because the right to bear arms exists to ensure that 
the political community's voice is expressed does not mean that indi-
viduals should not be given the entitlement to participate in the crea-
tion of that voice. 
The issue is instead whether the use of arms in defense of indi-
vidual rights against the political community is within the scope of the 
Second Amendment. Most Second Amendment advocates believe 
that it is. In particular, they believe that the right to bear arms pro-
tects individuals' natural rights to self-defense.146 But, as I illustrated 
earlier, such an argument can be interpreted in either a standard-, in-
strumental-, or auxiliary-right fashion. 147 
B. Standard-Right Justifications 
By speaking of the right to bear arms as protecting a "natural 
right" to self-defense and self-preservation, which cannot be alienated 
upon entering civil society, Second Amendment advocates strongly 
suggest that they believe that self-defense by arms, like privacy, has 
noninstrumental value and that one reserves this right to self-defense 
by arms upon entering the social contract.148 
145. Amar, supra note 142, at 126-129. 
146. See infra note 148 and accompanying text. 
147. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. 
148. See MALCOLM, supra note 35, at 119-20, 162 (arguing that the right to bear arms was 
understood only within the context of the right to self-defense); Roland H. Beason, Commen-
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The first step in assessing this argument is determining whether 
citizens actually have natural rights to use arms in self-defense. If citi-
zens do not, then they could not possibly have reserved these rights 
upon entering civil society. 
If citizens do have a natural right to use arms in self-defense, it 
cannot be the right to use arms whenever it is necessary to protect 
themselves from harm, but only when it is necessary to protect their 
other natural rights. For example, if someone enters my house with 
the manifest intent to kill me, I have a natural right to protect myself, 
but the intruder has no such natural right to defend herself against 
me.
149 I have a right to self-defense because my right to life has been 
violated.150 The intruder has no right to self-defense, because I am not 
violating her right to life. 151 But such limitation on the natural right to 
tary, Printz Punts on the Palladium of Rights: It Is Time to Protect the Right of the Individual to 
Keep and Bear Arms, 50 ALA. L. REV. 561, 569-71 (1999) (stating that the Founders relied on 
the ideas of a natural right to self-defense and self-preservation in wording the Second Amend-
ment); Anthony J. Dennis, Clearing the Smoke from the Right to Bear Arms and the Second 
Amendment, 29 AKRON L. REV. 57, 73-75 (1995) (arguing that the right to bear arms was un-
derstood only within the context of the right to self-defense); Don B. Kates, Jr., Gun Control: 
Separating Reality from Symbolism, 20 J. CONTEMP. L. 353, 363-64 (1994) (arguing that the 
Founders believed that the right to bear arms was not only of social value, it was a "sacred per-
sonal right"); Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second 
Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 230 (1983) [hereinafter Kates, Handgun Prohibition] (ar-
guing that the Founders drafted the Second Amendment in light of their belief that self-defense 
is an inalienable right); Kates, supra note 35, at 102 (describing the "self defense origins of the 
second amendment" as "many and complex"); Lund, supra note 143, at 13-14 & n.34, 59 (argu-
ing that the Framers believed in an "individualistic" theory of the right to bear arms); Lund, su-
pra note 35, at 117-21 ("Certainly the existence of a protected individual interest in the means 
to self-preservation follows at least as reasonably from the text and history of the Constitution 
as do the general rights of privacy and self-expression."); David E. Murley, Private Enforcement 
of the Social Contract: Deshaney and the Second Amendment Right to Own Firearms, 36 DUQ. 
L. REV. 827,854-55 (1998) ("Locke, like Hobbes, recognized that no agreement with the sover-
eign could waive the right of self-defense."); L.A. Powe, Guns, Words, and Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1311, 1393-97 (1997) ("At the time of the Framing, self-
defense was perceived as an important individual right."); Robert Shalhope, The Ideological 
Origins of the Second Amendment, 69 J. AM. HIST. 599,604-12 (1982) (discussing the libertarian 
themes in early American attitudes toward the individual right to bear arms). 
149. For a discussion of Locke's account of self-defense, see Waldron, supra note 81, at 733-
37. 
150. LOCKE, supra note 16, §§ 16-18. I set aside more complicated problems of self-defense 
against those who threaten one's life innocently. These situations are discussed in NOZICK, su-
pra note 82, at 34-35; JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS 370 (1990); Larry Al-
exander, A Unified Excuse of Preemptive Self-Protection, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1475, 1482 
(1999); Larry Alexander, Self-Defense, Justification, and Excuse, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 53, 54 
(1993); Finkelstein, supra note 81, at 1369-72; Judith Jarvis Thomson, Self-Defense, 20 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 283, 287-88 (1991). 
151. LOCKE, supra note 16, §§ 16-18. 
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self-defense is unlikely to be objected to by Second Amendment ad-
vocates, who recognize that an individual right to bear arms would 
protect only the use of arms in legitimate defense of one's rights. 152 
A more serious concern is whether it follows from my natural 
right of self-defense that I have a natural right to possess arms to de-
fend myself. 153 The possession of arms, after all, imposes risks upon 
others. Like any dangerous instrumentality, arms may cause unjustifi-
able harm, whether through mistake or malicious intent. And since I 
am examining the viability of a standard argument for the right to 
bear arms, I cannot assume that arms in fact decrease the risk of un-
justifiable harm. For that is to argue that the right to bear arms is in-
strumental. To determine whether people have natural rights to pos-
sess arms, therefore, one must answer the questions of what risk of 
harm they may impose upon one another in the state of nature and 
what someone exposed to a high level of risk may do to protect her-
self. 
Assume that someone in the state of nature keeps a collection of 
machine guns to protect herself from harm. It is not impossible that 
she could use them in justifiable self-defense. But her collection im-
poses risks of improper or accidental use upon others. What rights do 
those exposed to these risks have? Is their only protection a right to 
compensation or punishment if these risks materialize? Or do they 
have a right against her possessing these weapons in the first place, a 
right that allows them to take preemptive action? 154 
I believe that the only right they have is to ex post compensation 
or punishment. Requiring everyone to relinquish their machine guns 
because everyone would thereby be made safer seems no different 
from requiring everyone to relinquish their right to adjudicate and 
punish rights violations to a governmental authority, on the grounds 
that a reduction in feuding and an increased efficiency in the en-
forcement of natural law would result. If the reduction of mutually 
152. E.g., Lund, supra note 143, at 64-65: 
Illegitimate violence comes about in three main ways: (1) an individual procures a 
gun in order to use it in crime; (2) an individual procures a gun for a legitimate pur-
pose, but ends up misusing it spontaneously; and (3) a gun obtained for legitimate 
purposes kills or injures someone through accident. 
153. To be sure, the possession of arms can be a natural right insofar as they are one's prop-
erty. But the right to bear arms must protect the possession of arms over and above the protec-
tions provided for one's property in general. It must prohibit the regulation of arms under those 
circumstances where other property could be regulated. 
154. For a path breaking discussion of this problem from someone in the natural rights tradi-
tion, see NOZICK, supra note 82, at 54-87. 
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imposed risk were enough to justify imposing such restrictions in the 
state of nature, everyone would have a natural duty to submit to gov-
ernmental authority, regardless of consent.155 The idea that everyone 
has such a natural duty is incompatible with Lockean individualism. 
The same point is true not merely concerning the riskiness of the 
weapons I use to defend my rights, but also the riskiness of the inves-
tigative methods I use to determine whether self-defense is necessary. 
Assume that I meet someone in the middle of the wilderness. She 
looks at me in a suspicious way, and her hand moves slightly toward 
her waist. I respond by shooting her dead. Have I violated natural 
law? I believe that the answer is the following: if she was reaching for 
a gun, my actions were in keeping with natural law; if she was trying 
to scratch a mosquito bite, I have violated natural law. For someone 
to argue against my actions simply on the basis of the fact that they 
were unreasonable-that is, that the aggregate effect of such acts of 
self-defense will decrease everyone's security-! can respond that, 
under natural law, I may defend my rights as I see fit. That does not 
mean that I may defend myself against those who are not, in fact, 
violating my rights. It simply means that no one may restrict my at-
tempts at self-defense simply because of the risk that they will go 
wrong. The only right anyone has in the state of nature is the right to 
punish me if my attempts at self-defense turn out to be improper. 
Therefore, there is a natural right to bear arms and to use those 
arms in legitimate self-defense-a right that does not depend upon in-
strumental arguments about whether arms increase the level of secu-
rity in society. The possession and use of arms has intrinsic, nonin-
strumental moral value on the basis of Lockean principles of 
autonomy and individualism. 156 
Accordingly, there are natural rights to use arms in self-defense 
that could be reserved upon entering civil society. But the idea that 
individuals would reserve these rights is nevertheless contrary to core 
Lockean principles. 157 Return to the argument, which arose in my dis-
155. Cf SCHMIDTZ, supra note 80, at 38 (arguing that since one has a right to punish only by 
the least risky acceptable method, even independents remaining in the state of nature have to 
let the state punish for them). 
156. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNARD GOETZ AND THE 
LAW ON TRIAL 32-33 (1988). 
157. Some Second Amendment advocates, like some supporters of the privilege against se lf-
incrimination, appeal to Hobbes's argument that the right of self-defense cannot be alienated. 
HOBBES, supra note 81 , at 165. For such arguments, see Lund, supra note 35, at 119; Randy E. 
Barnett & Don B. Kates, Under Fire: The New Consensus on the Second Amendment, 45 
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cussion of the privilege, that individuals entering civil society alienate 
their rights to defend themselves against improper punishment.158 
Such alienation was required, because that was the only way that the 
state could have the authority to adjudicate and punish violations of 
the law. For the state to have such authority is for citizens to be re-
quired to accept even erroneous punishment. If citizens were bound 
to accept only correct punishment, they would escape the state's 
authority simply whenever they were innocent of any wrongdoing. 
And that would put everyone right back into the state of nature. 
By the same token, those entering civil society must alienate 
their natural rights to defend themselves against harm, if the state is 
to have the authority to determine when and where self-defense is 
appropriate. 159 To say that the government has the authority to regu-
late self-defense through the criminal law is to say that citizens are 
bound by its decisions concerning appropriate self-defense even when 
these decisions are wrong. 
Citizens are bound by two types of wrong decisions concerning 
the scope of self-defense. First of all, they are bound by decisions that. 
fail to recognize what would be correct self-defense in the state of na-
ture. For in the state of nature one may undertake to defend oneself 
without regard to the riskiness of one's actions.160 But the whole point 
of entering civil society is to allow for the regulation of such risky ac-
tivities. If one retained one's full natural right to self-defense, the 
state would have no authority to prohibit unreasonable (even reck-
less) self-defense that turned out to be justified ex post. 
But one is also bound to abide by governmental decisions that 
fail to determine accurately the proper level of reasonable self-
defense. Even if one's act of self-defense would not create an unrea-
sonable risk of harm, one is bound to accept governmental decisions 
that say otherwise. If one alienated only one's natural right to defend 
oneself unreasonably, not only might much of criminal and tort law 
EMORY L.J. 1139, 1177-78 n.l84 (1996); Murley, supra note 148, at 854-55. But this retained 
right of self-defense, even if it does exist, cannot justify any legal entitlements. For, as I have 
already noted, see supra footnote 81, Hobbes is not speaking of a right of self-defense that puts 
upon the sovereign a duty to respect this right. It is simply the "right" that the condemned man 
being dragged to the gallows has to struggle against his executioner, a right that says nothing 
about what the state may or may not do. 
158. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text. 
159. For the clearest expression of this point in the context of a discussion of the Second 
Amendment, see Heyman, supra note 39, at 243. 
160. See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text. 
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become constitutionalized,161 one would escape the authority of the 
state whenever its laws failed to capture the correct standard of rea-
sonableness. Since people tend to read the scope of their rights and 
the rights of their kin too broadly, this possibility would mean rein-
troducing the chaos and feuding that it was the purpose of the social 
contract to avoid. Accordingly, one must alienate even one's right to 
defend oneself reasonably. It is for this reason that Locke himself in-
sists that rights to self-defense are not retained upon entering civil so-
ciety. Someone entering civil society "gives up to be regulated by laws 
made by the society" the power "of doing whatsoever he thought fit 
for the preservation of himself." 162 
This is the essential reason so many people find natural-rights ar-
guments for the Second Amendment incomprehensible. To give indi-
viduals a right to bear arms means increasing their ability to act in ac-
cordance with their own moral judgment concerning the scope of self-
defense. Arms enable people to enter into precisely the conflict that 
the authority of the state is supposed to reduce. It is inconsistent to 
accept the authority of the state to determine when self-defense is ap-
propriate, and at the same time demand a right to something that al-
lows one to resist its decisions. As a result, critics find supporters of 
the right to bear arms "anarchistic"163 and opposed to "communal 
strateg[ies] for collective security." 164 As Professor Garry Wills has 
put it: 
161. If this reserved right to reasonable self-defense were recognized in the Bill of Rights, 
there would be endless constitutional challenges of every criminal law that determines the ap-
propriate limits of self-defense. It is not surprising, therefore, that courts have refused to read a 
constitutional right of self-defense into the Due Process Clause. Rowe v. DeBruyn, 17 F.3d 
1047, 1052 (7th Cir. 1994); White v. Arn, 788 F.2d 338, 347 (6th Cir. 1986); Fields v. Harris, 675 
F.2d 219, 220 (8th Cir. 1982). But see Griffin v. Martin, 785 F.2d 1172, 1177 (4th Cir. 1986) 
(holding that the Constitution proscribes placing the burden of persuasion as to self-defense on 
the accused); Isaac v. Engle, 646 F.2d 1129, 1140 (6th Cir. 1980) (Merritt, J. , dissenting) (assert-
ing that the Constitution prohibits a state from eliminating the justification of self-defense). For 
the argument that a due process right to self-defense exists, see Nicholas Johnson, Beyond the 
Second Amendment: An Individual Right to Arms Viewed Through the Ninth Amendment, 24 
RUTGERS L.J. 1, I-16 (1992) (arguing the right to self-defense is incorporated within the Ninth 
Amendment); Anders Kaye, Dangerous Places: The Right to Self-Defense in Prison and Prison 
Conditions Jurisprudence, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 693, 704-09 (1996) (discussing the constitutional 
right to self-defense within the context of prison inmates); James E. Robertson, "Fight or F . .. " 
and Constitwional Liberty: An Inmate's Right to SelFDefense when Targeted by Aggressors, 29 
IND. L. REV. 339,358-59 (1995) (same). 
162. LOCKE, supra note 16, § 129; see also id. § 171 (explaining that individuals give up 
power to the political community to preserve "lives, liberties, and possessions"). 
163. Bogus, supra note 12, at 320. 
164. Bellesiles, supra note 8, at 259. 
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Every civilized society must disarm its citizens against each 
other. ... Every handgun owned in America is an implicit declara-
tion of war on one's neighbor. When the chips are down, its owner 
says, he will not trust any other arbiter but force personally 
wielded.165 
165 
Standard-right justifications of the Second Amendment run into 
the very same problems as standard-right justifications of the privi-
lege. The rights to self-defense that could justify the constitutional 
right were alienated to create civil society. 
C. Instrumental-Right Justifications 
Many defenders of the Second Amendment believe that wide-
spread gun ownership increases the level of security enjoyed by indi-
viduals.166 If they are correct, then the right to bear arms can be justi-
fied instrumentally. Because individuals entering civil society alienate 
their natural rights in part in order to enhance their personal security, 
they can be understood to limit this alienation by the requirement 
that they enjoy a certain level of protection from harm (presumably 
greater than that enjoyed in the state of nature). The enjoyment of 
this level of security is a reserved right. If widespread gun ownership 
can help protect this reserved right, it can be justified even though 
there is no noninstrumental argument for reserving the right to use 
arms in self-defense, the way that there is a noninstrumental argu-
ment for reserving the right to privacy. 
Many Second Amendment defenders believe that arms do not 
merely reduce the threat of violence from fellow citizens, but also the 
risk that the government will violate their other reserved rights. 167 Just 
as defenders of the privilege point to its use during the McCarthy era, 
Second Amendment advocates look to the postbellum South, where 
African-Americans' access to arms allowed them not merely to pro-
tect their right to personal security against the Ku Klux Klan but also 
· 165. Quoted in Don B. Kates, Jr., Public Opinion: The Effects of Extremist Discourse on the 
Gun Debate, in THE GREAT AMERICAN GUN DEBATE: ESSAYS ON FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE 
93, 109 (Don B. Kates , Jr. & Gary Kleck eds. 1997). 
166. Barnett & Kates, supra note 157, at 1234-59; John R. Lott, Jr. & David B. Mustard, 
Crime, Deterrence, and Right-To-Carry Concealed Handguns , 26 J. LEG. STUD. 1, 64-65 (1997); 
Lund, supra note 35 , at 123-29. 
167. STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED 72 (1994) (arguing that an 
armed populace can defend against domestic tyranny). 
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their other reserved rights against hostile state authorities.168 The Sec-
ond Amendment is justified instrumentally as "a paramount right by 
which other rights could be protected."169 
It is common for those giving such arguments to cite Black-
stone.170 However, Blackstone himself denied that those entering civil 
society would reserve any countermajoritarian moral rights. 171 His 
reason is the Lockean paradox: If there were such reserved rights, 
then an individual could escape the authority of the state simply by 
claiming that these reserved rights were violated. Since Blackstone 
rejects moral rights to resist the majority, he has no reason to give in-
dividuals legal rights to resist the majority. For Blackstone, the right 
to bear arms is instead a political right-the legal expression of the 
moral right of the political community as a whole to use arms to resist 
a tyrannical minority. 
But by adopting a more strictly Lockean approach, under which 
moral rights against the political community are reserved, the argu-
ment that the right to bear arms is an instrument for the protection of 
reserved rights is indeed possible, provided that arms do increase the 
likelihood that the government will respect reserved rights. If arms 
perform this function, there would be a reason for the political com-
munity to entrust its authority only to governments that have a right 
to bear arms in their constitutions as a second line of defense for 
these rights. 
Not surprisingly, critics of the Second Amendment reject these 
instrumental arguments. If arms really made individuals more secure, 
then there is less reason for them to enter into civil society in the first 
place. A foundational premise of social contract theory is that indi-
viduals' judgments concerning natural rights tend to be distorted by 
self-interest. People tend to perceive the extent of their rights and the 
rights of their kin too broadly, leading to feuding and mistaken acts of 
self-defense. The right to bear arms, by giving individuals the power 
to act on these flawed perceptions, simply reintroduces the chaos of 
168. See, e.g., Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 35 at 348-49 ("[The right to bear arms), seen 
in the eighteenth century as a mechanism that enabled a majority to check the excesses of a po-
tentially tyrannical national government, would for many blacks in the twentieth century be-
come a means of survival in the face of private violence and state indifference."). 
169. United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598,604 (N.D. Tex. 1999). 
170. l BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at 139-41; see e.g. MALCOLM, supra note 35, at 130; 
Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 35, at 322-23; Kates, supra note 35, at 93; Lund, supra note 35, 
at 120 n.4l. 
171. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text. 
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the state of nature that civil society was supposed to end. 172 It is "a 
prescription for anarchy-anarchy that is inconsistent with the protec-
tion of the other rights in the Bill of Rights. "173 
Furthermore, critics argue that a right to bear arms cannot pro-
tect rights that individuals or small groups have against the political 
community, for the political community will always have more arms 
than they do.174 Minorities "should fear a regime of decentralized 
violence because they are relatively weak and powerless; they do not 
have as many guns as their enemies."175 Only if the majority of the 
population were virtuous and therefore inclined to recognize individ-
ual rights would a right to bear arms indirectly protect these rights, by 
allowing the political community to restrain minorities who sought to 
violate them. 176 
In the end, the debate over instrumental justifications of the Sec-
ond Amendment comes down to one's views about the ability of pri-
vate ordering to bring about a stable and just society. But the fact re-
mains that beliefs about the aggregate social effects of the use of guns 
for self-defense are not the best indicator of support for the right to 
bear arms.177 There are plenty of defenders of the Second Amend-
ment who think that it protects something of moral importance de-
spite the fact that its aggregate social effects are largely negative-
that is, even though it increases the general risk of violence and does 
nothing to increase the chances that the government will respect 
172. David C. Williams, Constitlltional Tales of Violence: Populists, Outgroups, and the Mul-
ticulwral Landscape of the Second Amendment, 74 TUL. L. REV. 387, 483 (1999); see also Belle-
sites, supra note 8, at 250 ("Who chooses when it is time for 'the people' to use their arms 
against the government? Does Linda Thompson get to choose? Timothy McVeigh?"). 
173. DENNIS A. HENIGAN ET AL., GUNS AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE MYTH OF SECOND 
AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR FIREARMS IN AMERICA 21 (1996); see also Andrew D. Herz, 
Gun Crazy: Constitutional False Consciousness and Dereliction of Dialogic Responsibility, 75 
B.U. L. REv. 57, 112 (1995) (stating that the Second Amendment ideology has contributed to 
" America's unparalleled level of gun violence" ). 
174. See Carl T . Bogus, Race, Riots, and Guns, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1365, 1367 (1993) (" Afri-
can-Americans have been particularly victimized by guns and the so-called ' right to bear 
arms."'). 
175. Williams, supra note 172, at 463. 
176. Williams, Civic Republicanism, supra note 8, at 63-68, 585-86; Williams, Militia Move-
ment, supra note 8, at 904. 
177. Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413,451 (1999) 
("Deterrence considerations don't genuinely explain opinions on either side [of the debate over 
the Second Amendment and gun control]. Expressive considerations matter much more: for 
proponents and opponents alike, guns and gun control bear social meanings that go to the heart 
of their fundamental moral commitments and cultural identities." ). 
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other reserved rights. 178 The right to bear arms is not justified instru-
mentally. Instead the use of arms in defense of one's other rights is it-
self something to which one has a reserved right. 
In this respect, Second Amendment advocates sound just like 
other civillibertarians.179 The argument for the Fourth Amendment is 
not refuted by the fact that this right increases the incidence of vio-
lence and criminality in society . 1 ~0 The point of the Fourth Amend-
ment is that the very thing that it protects-privacy-is of moral 
value. It simply does not matter, as far as the justification of the 
Fourth Amendment is concerned, that protecting privacy has social 
costs. Instead, these social costs merely come into play in determining 
the scope of this right. 
As I have argued earlier, these intuitions stand behind standard-
right arguments that the right to bear arms protects a reserved right 
to self-defense. The problem with such arguments, however, is that an 
essential purpose of entering into the social contract is the alienation 
of this right. 
D. Auxiliary-Right Justifications 
But to say that one alienates one's natural right to self-defense 
does not mean that one alienates it unconditionally. Just because 
someone entering civil society no longer has the right to act as he sees 
178. See, e.g., id. (explaining that support for the Second Amendment often stems from the 
supporter's ideology rather than from a belief in the instrumental effect of broad Second 
Amendment rights). 
179. See L.A. Powe, Jr., Guns, Words, and Constitlllionallnterpretation, 38 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1311, 1401 (1997): 
The Bill of Rights creates spheres of autonomy from government in which individuals 
can choose whether to exercise a set of guarantees. The Second Amendment is. no less 
a part of these guarantees than speech, religion, protection from self-incrimination, or 
the right to be paid if government takes your property. The Second Amendment 's 
pedigree and birth certificate are remarkably similar to the First's .... 
Lund, supra note 143, at 31 n.72, 68-69 (comparing the Second Amendment to the First 
Amendment); Van Alstyne, supra note 8, at 1239-41 (same). 
180. The Court routinely speaks of the Fourth Amendment as balancing privacy against law 
enforcement interests. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337-38 (1985) (holding that a 
student's privacy interest may outweigh the law enforcement interests in searching a school 
locker); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,906-07 (1984) (noting that the decision whether to 
impose the "exclusionary sanction" in a particular case requires "weighing the costs and benefits 
of preventing the use ... of inherently trustworthy tangible evidence"). Since there is a balanc-
ing involved, it must be the case that law enforcement interests are, at times, sacrificed to pri-
vacy. 
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"fit for the preservation of himself and the rest of mankind," 181 does 
not mean he gives up his right to self-defense utterly. No one can con-
sent to be a slave, that is, to be killed or harmed for any reason what-
soever. Because one alienates one's rights only with the intention to 
"better ... preserve himself ... (for no rational creature can be sup-
posed to change his condition with an intention to be worse)," politi-
cal power is limited. 182 
This means that if the government fails to provide me with ade-
quate personal security or violates my other reserved rights, I return 
to the state of nature and may once again exercise my natural right to 
defend myself through arms, even though it might be true that the use 
of arms, in the aggregate, decreases everyone's security. This idea is 
very intuitive: if the government abandons me to death at the hands 
of third parties, it no longer has the authority to require me to abide 
by its laws. If it did, its authority over me would be absolute. I would 
be a slave. 
The Lockean state must accept the validity of these arguments. 
The use of arms in self-defense under such circumstances is a form of 
legitimate defense of one's reserved rights. It is something valuable 
on its own, as an expression of the Lockean principles of autonomy 
and individualism. To retain its authority to prohibit the use of arms 
in self-defense, therefore, the government must claim that it is pro-
tecting reserved rights, including the right to sufficient security, even 
if it fails to protect individuals from harm under all circumstances. 
But what happens when the government and an individual dis-
agree about whether this condition for authority has been satisfied? 
Just as one focal point for disagreement over the state's authority is 
the criminal trial, another is when an individual is threatened by im-
minent violence, is unable to use the police or any other arm of the 
government to protect herself, and yet is prohibited by the state from 
engaging in what she believes is appropriate self-defense. The gov-
ernment will claim that the individual is still obligated to abide by the 
laws governing self-defense, even if these laws are wrong, because she 
is enjoying a level of security greater than what she would enjoy in 
the state of nature. On the other hand, the individual has a good 
claim that she has in fact been abandoned by the state and so is free 
to defend herself as she sees fit. 
181. LOCKE, supra note 16, § 129. 
182. !d. § 131. 
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One now confronts the Lockean paradox. If the government 
claims the authority to decide these disagreements and prohibit self-
defense no matter what the individual thinks, then its authority is ab-
solute, and citizens are really slaves. Although the government may 
give everyone plenty of rights to defend themselves, it could abandon 
them to death at the hands of third parties if it wanted to. Since this 
conclusion is intolerable, it appears that an auxiliary right to bear 
arms is necessary. The government must give individuals the rights to 
engage in self-defense that they would have if it were violating their 
reserved rights, even though these rights are anarchistic in the sense 
that they undermine the government's ability to regulate self-defense 
in situations where it in fact has the authority to do so. 
Locke makes the argument for an auxiliary right to bear arms 
even stronger, by suggesting that when a citizen is threatened with 
imminent violence, the state in fact has no authority to forbid her 
from exercising her natural right of self-defense.183 The state cannot 
even begin to offer her a superior alternative to the state of nature 
under those circumstances where it is unable to enforce its will. These 
situations are pockets of the state of nature within civil society. 
If Locke really means this, then it should follow that the state has 
no authority to regulate by law one's attempts at self-defense under 
such circumstances. Assume that I meet someone in the middle of the 
wilderness. She looks at me in a suspicious way, and her hand moves 
slightly toward her waist. I respond by obliterating her with a ba-
zooka. My action looks unreasonable (both in terms of the weapon I 
used and in terms of the method I used to determine whether self-
defense was appropriate). This is true even if the person I killed was 
183. See id. § 19: 
Thus a thief, whom 1 cannot harm, but by appeal to the law, for having stolen all that 
1 am worth, 1 may kill when he sets on me to rob me but of my horse or coat, because 
the law, which was made for my preservation, where it cannot interpose to secure my 
life from present force, which if lost is capable of no reparation, permits me my own 
defence and the right of war, a liberty to kill the aggressor, because the aggressor al-
lows not time to appeal to our common judge, nor the decision of the law, for remedy 
in a case where the mischief may be irreparable. Want of a common judge with 
authority puts all men in a state of nature; force without right upon a man's person 
makes a state of war, both where is, and is not, a common judge. 
See also Heyman, supra note 39, at 245 ("Locke holds that when an individual faces an immi-
nent attack on his life or person, he has a right to use all necessary force to defend himself. To 
this extent, the right to self-defense is an inalienable one which is retained within civil society.") 
(footnote omitted). 
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armed. But the state cannot punish me on these grounds, since it lacks 
the authority to do so.184 
The best the government could do is to punish me if self-defense 
was not justified ex post. ln fact it is not even clear that it could do 
that. The government could punish me on such grounds only if it 
could rely, not on its authority, but on its perception that I violated 
natural law. It would simply be acting like any other player in the 
state of nature, enforcing natural law as it sees fit. The problem with 
such an approach, however, is that Locke requires that the govern-
ment's monopoly on force be justified by its authority, not by the fact 
that it has the naked power to compel everyone else to abide by its 
perceptions of naturallaw. 185 Accordingly, under Lockean principles, 
it would appear that the government would not be able to regulate my 
actions in any way in these state-of-nature pockets. 
To keep governmental authority from breaking down completely 
in these situations, one must assume that the government claims the 
authority to regulate by law even responses to imminent violence. 
This is not an absurd view. After all, to the extent that the govern-
ment is protecting citizens from violence, they are benefiting from this 
at every moment, even when it cannot protect them against a par-
ticular threat. But the idea that the government has lost its authority 
in such cases, despite the anarchistic consequences that follow from 
such a claim, is not absurd either. And once again, if the government 
is the one with the authority to decide this disagreement, it must be 
claiming absolute authority. 
This idea that acts of imminent violence put everyone in the state 
of nature, allowing them to exercise their natural rights of self-
defense, stands behind many natural rights arguments for the Second 
Amendment. Consider the following passage from National Rifle As-
sociation President Charlton Heston's address to the Congress of Ra-
cial Equality at its annual banquet in honor of Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr.: 
What civil right could possibly be more fundamental than the right 
to protect your life, your family and your freedom from whoever 
would take it away? ... "All men were created equal" may have 
184. Professor Steven Heyman argues that it is Locke's view that the state would retain the 
authority to regulate the use of arms in situations where one is threatened by imminent vio-
lence. Heyman, supra note 39, at 245-46. But he does not say how Locke would justify such 
authority. 
185. See supra note 21-22 and accompanying text. 
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been our message in 1963. Today, Jet our message be just as simple 
and just as strong: "All people have an unalienable right to defend 
their lives and their liberty from whomever would harm them, and 
with whatever means necessary."1M 
At first glance, this sounds like an anarchistic denial that anyone en-
tered into the social contract at all. After all, the point of the social 
contract is to give up natural rights to defend oneself, because the un-
bridled exercise of these rights leads to feuding. Without such aliena-
tion of rights to self-defense, the government would lack any author-
ity to regulate self-defense by law. 
And yet Heston's comments are in keeping with Lockean theory 
after all, for citizens do have a reserved natural right to defend them-
selves, including by force of arms. They may exercise this right when 
the government fails in its duty to provide them with sufficient secu-
rity or violates other reserved rights. This right to self-defense 
through force of arms exists even if arms fail to increase the level of 
security in society or the likelihood that other natural rights will be 
respected. It instead has its source in Lockean principles of autonomy 
and individualism. And thus Heston is correct when he says that this 
is a right to protect oneself "by whatever means necessary"-that is, 
whatever the level of danger these arms create. 
Finally, Heston is also right in implying that an auxiliary legal 
right to bear arms is necessary to protect this reserved right. For if the 
government may refuse to provide citizens with the arms they need to 
protect themselves, it is claiming the authority to determine for itself 
whether it is providing them with adequate security and is respecting 
their other reserved rights. And that means its authority is absolute. 
Accordingly, just as defenders of the privilege believe that com-
pelled self-incrimination is a form of "debasement"187 and "subordina-
tion of the self to the state," 188 Second Amendment advocates argue 
that disarming the population is "a humiliating and debasing degrada-
tion."189 Without the right to defend themselves as they see fit, the 
state can abandon citizens to death if it wants to. They are its slaves. 
186. Charlton Heston, Address to the Congress of Racial Equality at Its Annual Banquet in 
Honor of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., at http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2001/3/19/ 
210522.shtml (March 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
187. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 261 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). 
188. LUBAN, supra note 68, at 194. 
189. James B. Whisker, The Citizen-Soldier Under Federal and State Law, 94 W. VA . L. 
REV. 947, 963 n.52 (1992) (quoting 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 168-69 (statement of Patrick Henry)); 
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Understanding the right to bear arms as auxiliary helps explain 
the close relationship that Second Amendment advocates see be-
tween disarming a population and totalitarianism: 
If one believes that the people are to serve the state, that the rights 
of the people are created or granted by the state, or that the security 
of the state itself has paramount importance, then the right to keep 
and bear arms is a dangerous vehicle for subversion that must be 
eliminated; and eliminated it has routinely been in totalitarian coun-
tries.190 
Second Amendment critics are mystified by such views, given that 
many liberal democracies have extremely restrictive gun control laws. 
Since these countries give their citizens exactly the same standard 
rights to free speech, privacy, autonomy and personal security that 
citizens of the United States receive, it seems absurd to say that they 
are totalitarian. And yet by failing to give individuals the ability to de-
fend their reserved rights as they see fit, these governments are totali-
tarian in insisting that the only views about the limits of their author-
ity that matter are their own. They are the authority on the extent of 
their authority. And that means that their authority has no real limits 
at all. 
Of course, by giving individuals arms to defend their reserved 
rights, an auxiliary Second Amendment also allows them to use these 
same arms to frustrate the government's legitimate attempts to assert 
its authority. Those whose reserved rights are not violated may never-
theless use their arms to frustrate the government's efforts to increase 
the security of the population. The right to bear arms is anarchistic. 
These anarchistic consequences in the end frustrate all attempts to 
delineate the scope of the right in a coherent fashion. 
E. The Second Amendment's Incoherent Scope 
Unlike the privilege, the problem of the Second Amendment's 
scope has not been considered pressing, because the predominant ap-
proach of the courts, largely on the authority of the Supreme Court 
see also Harmer, supra note 14, at 100 (stating that gun ownership fosters "vigorous virtues of 
independence, self-reliance and vigilance"); Kates, Handgun Prohibition, supra note 148, at 217 
n.53 (arguing that the Founders viewed an armed citizenry as more likely to be independent and 
self-reliant); Scott Bursor, Note, Toward A Functional Framework for Interpreting the Second 
Amendment, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1125, 1137-39 (1996) (arguing that the Founders saw possession 
of arms as essential to citizens' moral development). 
190. Harmer, supra note 14, at 55-56. 
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case of United States v. Miller/ 91 has been to read the Second 
Amendment as ensuring only that formal and organized state militias 
may remain armed. 192 These interpretations have guaranteed that vir-
tually no Second Amendment challenge of gun control legislation 
would succeed. 
But recently, in United States v. Emerson/93 the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals concluded that Miller does not take a stand one way 
or the other concerning a states-rights interpretation of the Second 
Amendment. 194 Since Miller left the issue open, the Emerson court 
was free to accept revisionist arguments that the text and legislative 
history of the Second Amendment shows that it was intended to "pro-
tect[) the right of individuals ... to privately possess and bear their 
own firearms." 195 
Emerson put the scope of the Second Amendment on center 
stage. But because it did not answer the question of what moral role 
the Second Amendment plays, the Emerson Court was unable to give 
a reason why it limited the scope of the Second Amendment as it 
did. 196 Although the court rejected what it called "collective right" in-
terpretations, it meant by this only views that the Amendment pro-
tects the rights of states. 197 The court did not specifically endorse the 
view that the Second Amendment protects reserved rights of indi-
viduals against the political community. To be sure, it quoted ap-
provingly passages that supported such a view.198 But it quoted just as 
191. 307 ,J.S. 174 (1939). 
192. Hici~man v. Block, 81 F.3d 98, 100-01 (9th Cir. 1996); Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 
124 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1976); Stevens v. United 
States, 440 F.2d 144, 149 (6th Cir. 1971). 
193. 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001 ). 
194. /d. at 221-27. 
195. /d. at 260. 
196. The particular question of scope was whether Emerson's Second Amendment rights 
prevented his indictment for possessing a firearm while subject to a temporary injunction, 
brought against him by his wife in the context of divorce proceedings, that prohibited "the use, 
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against ... [an) intimate partner or child." /d. 
at 212-15 (referencing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) (2000)). The Emerson court concluded that it 
did not. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 260-64. Despite the fact that the court issuing the injunction did 
not arrive at an explicit finding that Emerson posed a credible threat of violence to his wife and 
children, the Emerson court found that the general evidentiary standards for a temporary in-
junction under Texas law established a sufficient nexus with "lawless violence" to override Em-
erson's right to bear arms. /d. at 264. But it did not explain why Emerson's Second Amendment 
right should be overridden in this fashion. It simply took for granted that a nexus with lawless 
violence was sufficient to do so. 
197. Emerson , 270 F.3d at 221-27 . 
198. Id. at 255-57. 
HeinOnline -- 52 Duke L.J. 175 2002-2003
2002) THE PARADOX OF AUXILIARY RIGHTS 175 
approvingly passages in which the Second Amendment was inter-
preted as a political right to participate in a communitarian revolution 
against a tyrannical minority.199 
One must look instead to the academic literature on the Second 
Amendment to get some idea of what a principled delineation of its 
scope would look like.200 I have already suggested the probable scope 
of a political right to bear arms, which would be too narrow to satisfy 
most Second Amendment advocates, since it would protect only the 
right to bear arms in the event of a communitarian political rebel-
1. 201 lOll. 
More significant for my purposes are the academic attempts to 
determine the scope of an individual right to bear arms. Don B. 
Kates, Jr., for example, has argued that such a right would exclude 
"weapons such as machine-type guns, flamethrowers, artillery, and 
atomic weapons, whose use, even in strict self-defense, would quite 
obviously menace one's neighbors."202 In the same spirit, Stephen P. 
Halbrook has suggested that its scope should exclude "dangerous and 
unusual" weapons, such as bombs or grenades, because of their ten-
dency to harm both the innocent and the guilty.203 
Although this limitation might make sense if the right to bear 
arms is instrumental, it seems curiously divorced from the "natural 
right" of self-defense that, they claim, the Second Amendment is sup-
posed to protect.204 Such a natural right, it will be remembered, has 
199. E.g., id. at 252 (quoting Federalist Tench Coxe's 1789 article, which suggests that "the 
people are confirmed ... in their right to keep and bear their private arms" to defend the coun-
try against tyrannical "civil rulers." Tench Coxe (originally published under the pseudonym "A 
Pennsylvanian"), Remarks on the First Part of the Amendments to the Federal Constitution, 
PHI LA. FED. GAZETTE, June 18, 1789, at 2, coil). 
200. Virtually every academic supporter of an individual-right approach has recognized that, 
like any other constitutional right, the Second Amendment must be limited in scope in accor-
dance with its social costs. See, e.g., Col. Charles J. Dunlap. Jr., Revolt of the Masses: Armed Ci-
vilians and the Insurrectionary Theory of the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 643, 677 
(1995) ("[The Second Amendment] should be subject to the same balancing test that has been 
successfully used in reconciling conflicting interests with respect to other amendments."); Lund, 
supra note 143, at 49 (suggesting that the Second Amendment requires "balancing individual 
liberty against public safety"). 
201. Jack N. Rakove, The Second Amendment: The Highest Stage of Originalism, 76 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 103, 159--60 (2000). 
202. Don B. Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment: A Dialogue, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
143, 146 (Winter 1986). 
203. Stephen P. Halbrook, What the Framers Intended: A Linguistic Analysis of the Right to 
"Bear Arms", 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 151, 160 (Winter 1986). 
204. HALBROOK, supra note 167, at 17; Barnett & Kates, supra note 157, at 1177; Kates, 
Handgun Prohibition, supra note 148, at 230; Kates, supra note 35, at 89-103; Glenn Harlan 
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value independently of its tendency to increase or decrease the secu-
rity of the population. The natural right applies whenever in a par-
ticular situation arms are necessary to protect one's reserved rights. 
As Nelson Lund, criticizing Halbrook's analysis, has noted: 
This argument seems to assume that no citizen would ever be at-
tacked by someone who was protected by armor. The argument also 
seems to assume that aggressors are always surrounded by innocent 
people who would be endangered by the use of devices like gre-
nades or bazookas. Both assumptions would likely prove false in the 
very circumstances that most immediately concerned the Framers of 
the Second Amendment: attempts at political oppression by the 
205 government. 
The same point can be made about who may legitimately be pro-
hibited from carrying arms. For example, in response to the question 
of whether convicted felons have Second Amendment rights, the Em-
erson court said, without explanation, that "it is clear" they do not.206 
But the conclusion that felons lose their right to bear arms assumes 
that someone legitimately struggling against the government would 
never have been convicted of a felony. And this, of course, is false. 
Indeed, felons would appear to be the type of people who should 
particularly have a right to bear arms, since someone involved in a 
campaign of legitimate civil disobedience is likely to have been.con-
victed of a felony at some point. 
I believe that Lund criticizes Halbrook's attempt to limit the 
right to bear arms because Halbrook fails to take seriously the idea 
that the Second Amendment protects a natural right to self-defense. 
It is for this reason that Lund concentrates on just those cases where 
this natural right may be invoked-when the government, by violat-
ing citizens' reserved rights, loses its authority to regulate their ac-
tions in the interest of the common good. 
But if the right to bear arms is to do justice to this natural right of 
self-defense, then it is hard to see how one can avoid its taking on an-
archistic dimensions. The government cannot say to the Catholic for-
bidden by law to practice his religion that she may resist the tanks 
that enforce these laws with a rifle, but not with a bazooka, because 
the social costs of bazookas are too great. The government lost its 
Reynolds & Don B. Kates, The Second Amendment and States ' Rights: A Thought Experiment, 
36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1737, 1738 (1995). 
205. Lund, supra note 143, at 45-46. 
206. United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203,261 (5th Cir. 2001). 
HeinOnline -- 52 Duke L.J. 177 2002-2003
2002] THE PARADOX OF AUXILIARY RIGHTS 177 
authority to prohibit her from carrying a bazooka when it violated her 
reserved right against religious discrimination. Nor can the govern-
ment say to blacks it abandons to the Ku Klux Klan that they can use 
a pistol, but not a machine gun, to defend themselves against a lynch 
mob, because machine guns, if misused, are too dangerous. For the 
government lost the authority to forbid their use of machine guns 
when it violated their rights to personal security. 
To be sure, as the social costs of protecting the natural right of 
self-defense grow, one will find the desire to limit the scope of the 
Second Amendment overwhelming. A line will be drawn. But where 
it is drawn will conceptually and morally unmotivated. It will be pre-
cisely the same type of ad hoc balancing that has become the norm in 
Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.207 
CONCLUSION 
This, then, is the paradox of auxiliary rights, as it expresses itself 
in the Constitution. I do not want to suggest that the paradox is un-
avoidable. It can be sidestepped, by rejecting one of the Lockean 
principles upon which it is based. For example, one can argue, with 
Blackstone, that the authority of the political community is unlim-
ited.208 Or one can argue that the political community may exercise a 
monopoly on force without any authority-it is simply enough that it 
has the power to compel everyone else to comply by its views.209 But 
207. I cannot examine at this point what the scope of an instrumental right to bear arms 
would look like, although it should be noted that, as with other instrumental rights, its scope in 
uncertain cases should be viewed in the light of the moral right that it indirectly protects, 
namely, the right to security. 
208. See 1 Blackstone, supra note 36, at *156 ("[Parliament] hath sovereign and uncontro-
lable authority in making, confirming, enlarging, restraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving, and 
expounding [all] laws ... this being the place where that absolute despotic power, which must in 
all governments reside somewhere, is entrusted by the constitution of these kingdoms."). 
209. This is the approach that I took in Green, supra note 22, and which I attributed to 
Locke there. When the government and an individual disagree about whether the government is 
acting within its authority, the government may forbid civil disobedience, despite the fact that it 
has no authority to decide this disagreement, because it is simply exercising the prerogative of 
any agent in the state of nature to act on his perceptions of natural law. For this reason, I saw no 
reason why the government would have a duty to give individuals powers to defend themselves 
when such disagreements occur. As a result, auxiliary rights did not follow from Lockean prin-
ciples. The only purpose that a Lockean could find for the privilege, I argued, was the much less 
plausible one of giving symbolic expression to the fact that the government has no authority 
over the defendant and that the two are simply in the state of nature. 
It is still my view that the government does not need authority to exercise a monopoly of 
force. For this reason, I personally am opposed to the privilege against self-incrimination and 
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these positions are not Locke's and, for this reason, conflict with the 
political theory held by the Founders and standing at the heart of the 
Bill of Rights. 
To the extent that one remains attached to Lockean political 
theory, therefore, one must accept that auxiliary rights are paradoxi-
cal and that each side in the debate over these rights is worthy of both 
criticism and respect. Furthermore, as long as these rights are re-
tained in the Constitution, one must lower one's expectations con-
cerning the coherence of judicial determinations of their scope. 
the right to bear anns, understood as auxiliary rights. But I no longer believe that this follows 
from Lockean principles. 
